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Through out the world, new techniques are developed to test and evaluate systems. 
The Department of Defense and the US Air Force conduct numerous studies into the 
reliability and maintainability of current and future weapons systems in an effort to 
understand the reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) performance of these 
systems. Furthermore, they must verify RM&A characteristics of systems, which are still in 
the development phase. The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) is 
responsible for testing new equipment to ensure their RM&A characteristics meet 
specifications. 
Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational Readiness (RAPTOR) is the 
software tool developed by HQ AFOTEC to enhance existing analysis capabilities. RAPTOR 
is a modeling framework allowing quick creation of RM&A models for many systems. 
DoD has made verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of these simulation 
models an official requirement. This research outlines a generic VV&A plan that uses the 
appropriate tools and techniques to perform model verification, validation, and accreditation. 
This plan is then applied to RAPTOR 5.0 and a portion of verification and validation of 
RAPTOR is completed and recommendations for accreditation are made. 
x 
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Through out the world, new techniques are developed to test and evaluate 
systems. The Department of Defense and the US Air Force conduct numerous studies 
into the reliability and maintainability of current and future weapons systems in an effort 
to understand the reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) costs of these 
systems. Furthermore, they must verify RM&A characteristics of systems, which are still 
in the development phase. The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center 
(AFOTEC) is responsible for testing new equipment to ensure their RM&A 
characteristics meet specifications. AFOTEC also manages a large portion of the Air 
Force's weapon systems operational verification, validation, and testing. 
There are many circumstances that prevent AFOTEC or other users (civilian or 
military) to completely test equipment or weapon systems before acquisition. There are 
some constraints that organizations cannot ignore. Two of these constraints are time and 
cost. Compounding these constraints are systems, which have very long reliability 
requirements or are very expensive to test. It is difficult to test a system that has an 
expected life of decades. The equipment would often be obsolete before the test was 
complete. Other systems may be very costly and require destructive testing. Testing 
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hundreds of ballistic missiles in order to figure out their reliability is impractical because 
they are both too expensive and very lethal. These kinds of limiting factors are driving 
organizations to search for alternative ways to complete test and evaluation of new 
equipment. One of these alternative ways is simulation modeling which can be an easier 
way for predicting the system performance. However, a simulation model must go 
through the verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) process before it can be 
used by the Air Force. The objective of this effort is to perform a portion of verification 
and validation of RAPTOR, in addition to creating a generic VV&A plan that can be 
applied to most simulation models. 
Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational Readiness (RAPTOR) is the 
software tool developed by HQ AFOTEC to enhance existing analysis capabilities. 
RAPTOR is a modeling framework allowing quick creation of RM&A models for almost 
any system. RAPTOR is primarily intended to be used by HQ AFOTEC analysts in 
support of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). Since RAPTOR is so easy to use, 
there has been an explosion of requests from academic institutions for the tool. As stated 
in their web site, more than 300 commercial and government organizations also have 
copies of this tool [9]. RAPTOR has many advantages: 
1. Allows rapid creation of reliability and availability models for any system. 
2. Reduces the time required to complete a reliability and availability model from 
months to minutes by combining all the common elements of reliability modeling and 
simulation. 
3. Increases modeling productivity by 99%. 
4. Eliminates the need for manual calculation of reliability and availability of 
complex systems. 
RAPTOR is a powerful and user-friendly model, which makes it very easy to 
quickly model a system. The graphical user interface and strong emphasis on human 
factors make RAPTOR a very effective reliability analysis tool. 
1.2 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
Reliability, maintainability, and availability are concerned with a system's 
dependability and reparability under continued use. The definition for reliability is the 
probability that when operating under stated environmental conditions, the system will 
perform its intended function adequately for a specified time. Maintainability is defined 
as the probability that a failed system can be made operable in a specified interval of 
down time. Availability is defined as the probability that a system is operating 
satisfactorily at any point in time and is a measure of the ratio of the operating time of the 
system to the operating time plus the downtime [2]. These issues are becoming very 
important factors for product improvement. Companies try to impress the would-be 
clients by focusing on the RM&A of their products as a means of improving their 
competitiveness. In addition, RM&A analysis plays an integral part in the design and 
production of efficient, cost-effective systems. 
Reliability is a very fast growing and important field in consumer and capital 
goods industries, in space and defense industries, and in NASA and DoD agencies. 
Reliability provides the theoretical and practical tools to evaluate the capability of parts, 
components, products, and systems to perform their required functions. They must 
perform a specific function in a specified environment for a given period of time without 
failure. 
Reliability is analyzed early in product development. Analysts use analytical 
methods or simulation models to represent the RM&A aspects of their systems. As 
systems become more complex, analytical methods cannot be used. Reliability 
simulation offers an alternative path for early prediction of system performance. By 
using reliability analysis, design alternatives can be tested before production and the best 
option can be selected along with removing or improving identified design problems. 
1.3 W&A Issues 
Validation, verification, and accreditation (VV&A), in general terms, is a process 
of review, analysis, testing and approving of simulation models developed for a specific 
purpose. It is a methodology, which helps ensure the production of quality simulation 
results. 
VV&A is commonly used as a single expression; this is not to infer that the 
methodology is an all or nothing process. The objective of VV&A is to ensure the 
correctness, and consistency of the final product. VV&A may be performed by an 
independent agent, a VV&A-team, by the person(s) producing the product, or a 
combination of all. Model VV&A focuses on the prevention and the detection of errors, 
i.e. deviation from intent. This is accomplished using both manual and automated 
techniques. Errors include deficiencies such as unsatisfied requirements, the inclusion of 
extraneous functions, or using incorrect solution algorithms. An error may be in the 
coding of the model, the specification of the model, or the documentation. The error 
might be related to the functional correctness or another property, such as performance, 
or a more subjective attribute such as product quality. 
The motivation of testing a simulation model is to affirm model accuracy with 
methods that can be economically and effectively applied to both large scale and small- 
scale systems. One validation and verification approach does not fit all sizes of 
simulation projects. Different size simulation projects require different structures, 
different personnel, and different methodologies. A small project may only require a 
single analyst to obtain usable results, while a large project with various quality attributes 
may require several groups of analysts with different skills. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
Reliability simulation offers an easier path for evaluating RM&A characteristics 
of increasingly complex systems. The decisions being made with the simulation model 
are of particular importance. One of the most difficult problems facing a simulation 
analyst is that of trying to determine whether a simulation model is an accurate 
representation of the actual system being studied, i.e. whether the model is valid. In 
addition, the simulation model must be accredited by the using organization. Therefore, 
verification, validation, and accreditation process is critical to product evaluation and the 
final evaluation of the system. 
As these systems advance so must the reliability, maintainability, and availability 
analysis capability. The industrial community and the Air Force continue to use 
simulation methods for handling RM&A analysis. AFOTEC depends on RAPTOR to 
evaluate new Air Force systems. They are also depending on the upgrade of RAPTOR as 
a valid simulation program. The Air Force currently uses RAPTOR 2.0 to provide 
RM&A analysis on new equipment acquisitions. This model was verified, validated, 
accredited on 30 January 1996, however its capabilities are limited, and new systems 
require enhanced capabilities. 
RAPTOR 5.0 is an enhanced simulation model, which is intended to replace 
RAPTOR 2.0. This change, however, requires RAPTOR 5.0 to be verified, validated, 
and accredited in accordance with DoD and Air Force Instructions. A generic VV&A 
plan must be developed and applied to RAPTOR. This research will: 
1. Explore VV&A in the literature to gain more knowledge about the VV&A 
techniques and policies that are currently used. 
2. AFI16-1001 identifies the verification and validation agent's responsibility to 
develop a VV&A plan [10]. A generic plan will be developed that can be used 
for future VV&A purposes. This plan will be based on the Air Force Instruction 
and the insight provided by the literature review. 
3. Perform a partial verification and validation of RAPTOR simulation model by 
applying appropriate portions of this VV&A plan and provide recommendations 
for accreditation. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The objective of this thesis effort is to outline a generic VV&A plan that uses the 
appropriate tools and techniques to perform model verification, validation, and 
accreditation. This plan will be applied to RAPTOR 5.0 and a portion of verification and 
validation of RAPTOR will be completed and recommendations for accreditation will be 
made. This thesis is organized into chapters according to subject areas. Chapter 2 
presents a background on VV&A issues, an overview of RM&A, and an introduction to 
RAPTOR. Chapter 3 presents a generic VV&A plan, tools and techniques for 
verification, validation, and accreditation of simulation models. Chapter 4 will apply the 
VV&A structure provided in Chapter 3 to the RAPTOR model. The partial RAPTOR 
verification and validation will be completed and documented according to the test plan. 
Recommendations for accreditation will be given but an overall and complete VV&A is 
outside the scope of this effort. Chapter 5 represents the conclusions of this thesis, 
recommendations for improving RAPTOR and areas for future study. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability Overview 
Reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) analysis form the 
foundation of the reliability engineering field. New and advanced studies continue to be 
an important area of research. Improved methods like reliability simulation provide 
analysts a technique for handling system evaluations easily in the area of reliability. 
The evolution of reliability started with the mechanical systems. As the electrical 
systems started to be widely used after the first quarter of the twentieth century, the 
importance of reliability started to increase. At the early stages the reliability of the 
electrical systems was improved by simply adding redundant components and wiring. 
World War II, Korea, and the Vietnam War changed the military focus to weapon 
systems reliability. The explosion in electronics after the 1950s made reliability a valued 
branch of engineering. With the use of new and widely applied techniques in reliability, 
it became a part of the total quality initiatives of companies trying to gain a competitive 
edge. 
Kececioglu states that reliability has the following objectives [2]: 
1. Determine if the performance of components, equipment, and systems is within 
specifications for the desired function period. If it is not, find out whether it is the 
result of a malfunction or of a failure, which requires corrective action. 
2. Determine the pattern of the failures, causes, and time to failure distributions. 
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3. Determine the failure rate, the mean life, the reliability of components, 
equipment, and systems, and their associated confidence limits at some desired 
confidence levels. 
4. Based on the results obtained, provide guidelines for corrective actions that 
should be taken. 
5. Reevaluate the performance of the units after corrective actions taken to assure 
that these actions were the correct ones and as effective as intended. 
6. Determine the growth in the mean life and the reliability of units during their 
research, engineering, and development phase. 
7. Provide a means to statistically and scientifically determine if a redesign has 
indeed improved the failure rate, mean life or reliability of components or 
equipment with the desired confidence. 
8. Provide a statistical and scientific means to determine which one of the two 
manufacturers of a component or equipment or design should be preferred from 
the failure rate, mean life or reliability point of view while all other factors being 
practically and economically the same. 
9. Select the best reliability test from the point of view of the test time, risk levels, 
number of equipment, cost, and personnel available to demonstrate the specified 
or desired failure rate, mean life or reliability at the chosen confidence level. 
10. Provide management with the reliability test results, as requested by them, 
and in the format that will convey the requested information in a very easily 
understood form so they can make the right decision. 
If systems are simple or not very complicated in size, they can be evaluated by 
using analytical methods. However, these methods are limited and cumbersome if the 
systems become more complex and larger in size. 
2.2 Analysis Techniques 
2.2.1 Analytical Solutions 
Systems are generally broken down into sub-systems of components for RM&A 
analysis. There are several categories of component systems. The common ones include 
series, parallel, series-parallel, and complex systems. The simple example of a series 
system contains two components as shown in Figure 1. 
1 2        — 
Figure 1. Series System 
The reliability of a component (p) ranges from 0 to 1. Given the reliabilities of 
the two components arepi andp2 respectively and the assumption of independently 
operating components, then the system reliability function hip) for the series system is: 
h(p)=pl*p2 (2.1) 
A two component parallel system is shown in Figure 2. 
1 
Figure 2. Parallel System 
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In a parallel system the reliability function is: 
h(p)=l-[(l-Pl)*(l-p2)] (2.2) 
Series-parallel systems consist of combinations of series and parallel components 
in the system. 
1 
Figure 3. Series-Parallel System 
The reliability function for this system is: 
h{p) = [1- (l-Pl) * (l-p2)] *p3 * [1- (l-p4) * (l-p5)]        (2.3) 
An example for complex structure can be shown with the structure in Figure 4. 
3 1 ' 
2 4 
Figure 4. Complex Structure 
The system reliability function for the complex structure is: 
h(p) = «Pi* Ps) + (Pi* Pd + (p2* Pi) + (Pi* Pd 
- (Pi* Pi* Pi) - (Pi*Ps*pd - (P*Ps*Pi) -(p*Pi* A) + (p*Pi* Ps*PA))       (2.4) 
As it can be seen from above, the complexity of the reliability function increases 
as the size of the system increases. There are several analytical methods for determining 
the steady-state properties of systems, including Network Theory, Markov Models, Cut 
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Sets, Venn Decomposition, and Non-Homogenous Poisson Process. Analytical methods 
can directly solve many reliability systems and provide exact solutions. However, if the 
complexity of the system increases, analytical solutions become cumbersome and 
impractical. In these kinds of situations where analytical methods are inadequate, 
simulation provides a dependable and preferable alternative. The results of simulation 
models approximate system performance. Although analytical methods provide exact 
solutions, a reasonable approximation through simulation is better than no solution when 
analytical methods fail. As Law and Kelton state, the accuracy of the results is getting 
better [13]. Although the accuracy is getting better, there is still need to improve the 
modeling capability of current simulation tools to account for realistic behavior of real- 
world systems. 
2.2.2 Simulation Analysis 
Simulation analysis is an alternative to analytical models and solutions. Most of 
these simulation tools are based on Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulation 
makes consecutive draws from varying distributions representing the failure and repair 
rates. By using these distributions, the simulation predicts the actual system 
performance. Monte Carlo simulation offers a reasonable solution for determining 
reliability, maintainability, and availability to complex systems when analytical methods 
are inadequate. This technique applies to almost all types of systems, from simple to 
complex reliability block diagram. Reliability block diagram simulation has a great 
potential for predicting large-scale system reliability and availability. 
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Simulation analysis can be used in two different ways. In the first choice, the 
users create their own simulation model by writing their own code. This can be a tough 
choice if one does not have enough experience with a high-end simulation language. 
Even if the users are capable of code writing, they still have to be sure that their model is 
working correctly and they have built the right model for their needs. 
The second choice is an easier approach. An analyst can use a verified and 
validated simulation model. In this case, they do not have to worry about the VV&A 
issues. These software products are much more user-friendly and give more flexibility 
and speed to the user. Some examples of reliability simulation models are Relex, Item, 
Avesim and RAPTOR. 
2.3 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
Military weapon or defense systems are often large and extremely complex. They 
are difficult to understand and evaluate without the help of modeling and simulation. 
Discrete event and time-stepped simulations have been the foundations for the major 
computer tools for analyzing combat since the 1960s. Decisions and actions involving 
billions of dollars have been and will continue to be influenced by these simulations. 
Realizing this, DoD has made verification, validation, and accreditation of these 
simulations an official requirement [7]. 
According to Air Force Instruction 16-1001, verification is the process of 
determining that modeling and simulation (M&S) accurately represents the developer's 
conceptual description and specifications. This is accomplished by identifying and 
eliminating mistakes in logic, mathematics, or programming. This process establishes 
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that the M&S code and logic correctly perform the intended functions. AFI16-1001 
defines validation as the process of determining the degree to which a model is an 
accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the 
model [10]. Validation process can also be used to identify necessary model 
improvements. Validation has two major components. The first part is structural 
validation. This includes an internal examination of M&S assumptions, architecture, and 
algorithms in the context. The second part is output validation, which determines how 
well, the M&S results compare with the perceived real world. Accreditation is the 
official determination by the accreditation authority whether or not the modeling and 
simulation is acceptable for a specific purpose. This determination considers the 
verification and validation status of a specific model version, its data support, and the 
analyst or the users that operate the model. The accreditation authority is the individual 
who is responsible and accountable for decisions or actions based upon the specific 
modeling and simulation usage. The decision to accredit a model or simulation rests only 
with the accreditation authority. The verification and validation documentation of model 
will be reviewed in the later sections of this effort. 
According to AFI 16 - 1001 the key actions and elements in Figure 5 constitute a 
flexible process that accommodates VV&A activities throughout the M&S' life cycle. 
Even though the Air Force and other experts in this area have their own definitions and 
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Figure 5. Air Force VV&A Process 
In this effort, the objective is to come up with a new VV&A plan, which can be 
applied to general modeling and simulation that can be used by the Air Force. The 
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foundation of this plan will be situated over the Air Force VV&A process, but it would 
also be applicable to models used outside the Air Force. 
The first part of Figure 5 shows the steps accomplished during the development 
phase of the model. The second part introduces the W&A effort accomplished by the 
agent using the VV&A plan. The agent should follow some rules and principles during 
this process. 
Verification and validation are based on certain underlying principles. According 
to the Webster's dictionary, a principle is defined as: 
1. An accepted or professed rule of action or conduct. 2. A fundamental, 
primary or general laws or truth from which others is derived. 3. A fundamental 
doctrine or tenet; a distinctive ruling opinion. 
Understanding and applying these principles is very important for the success of a 
modeling and simulation effort. Principles help the researchers, agents and managers to 
better understand what validation and verification is about. 
According to Balci, et al, the following principles can be helpful during the 
VV&A phase of a modeling and simulation [14]: 
1. Verification and validation must be conducted throughout the entire modeling 
and simulation life cycle. 
2. The outcome of verification and validation should not be considered as a binary 
variable, meaning the model or the simulation is absolutely correct or absolutely 
incorrect. 
3. A simulation model is built with respect to the modeling and simulation 
objectives and its credibility should be judged with respect to those objectives. 
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4. Verification and validation requires independence and objectivity to prevent 
developer's bias and influence. 
5. Verification and validation is difficult. It is more difficult if verification and 
validation does not start with the development of the model. 
6. Complete simulation model testing is not possible. 
7. Verification and validation must be planned and documented. 
8. Errors must be prevented. (Type I, Type II, Type III) 
9. Errors should be detected as early as possible in the modeling and simulation 
life cycle. This prevents costs of revising the model in the later stages of 
development. 
10. Multiple response problems must be recognized and resolved properly. 
11. Successful testing of each module does not imply overall model credibility. 
The interaction between the modules must also be tested. 
12. Simulation model validity does not guarantee the credibility and acceptability 
of simulation results. 
13. A well-formulated problem is essential to the acceptability and accreditation 
of modeling and simulation results. 
Verification and validation is not a phase or step in the modeling and simulation 
life cycle, but a continuous activity throughout the entire life cycle as announced in 
principle 1. Conducting VV&A for the first time at the end of the M&S application life 
cycle would be like a teacher who only gives a final examination. The student does not 
know if she or he has any deficiencies until the course is complete. Frequent tests and 
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homework through the quarter notifies the student about his or her deficiencies so they 
can study more and improve their knowledge about the course. 
The situation in conducting verification and validation is similar to this example. 
VV&A activities throughout the entire M&S life cycle are intended to highlight any 
quality deficiencies. This helps the researchers early on to improve the product during 
the life cycle. Errors are detected as early as possible. Delaying verification and 
validation to later stages increases the possibility of making Type I and Type II errors. 
Type I error is done when the model is rejected even though the model is valid. Type II 
error is made when the model is accepted even though the model is not valid. 
2.4 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Process 
Three basic approaches are used in deciding if a simulation model is credible or 
not. Each of the approaches requires the model development team to conduct verification 
and validation as a part of the model development process. The most common approach 
is to have the development team make the accreditation decision. This is a subjective 
decision based on the results of the various tests and evaluations conducted as a part of 
the model development process. 
Another approach is independent verification and validation (IV&V), which uses 
a third party to decide whether the model is credible. The third party is independent of 
both the model development team and the model sponsor. After the model is developed, 
the third party conducts an evaluation to determine its credibility. Based upon this 
evaluation, the third party makes a subjective decision on the accreditation of the model. 
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This approach is usually used when a large cost is associated with the problem requiring 
the simulation model. 
The IV&V approach ranges from simply reviewing the verification and validation 
conducted by the model development team to a complete verification and validation 
effort. A complete IV&V evaluation is extremely costly and time consuming. If a 
decision is made to use IV&V, it should be early in the model development process. This 
decision would significantly decrease the cost of VV&A. If the model has already been 
developed, the IV&V agent should only evaluate the verification and validation that has 
already been performed before. Starting the VV&A process after the model has been 
developed would be very time consuming and this again increases the cost. 
The last approach to determine model validity is to use a scoring technique. 
Scores or weights are determined subjectively during the validation process. Then they 
are combined to determine the category scores and the overall score for the simulation 
model. A simulation model is considered valid if its overall and category scores are 
greater than a certain predetermined score. 
Sargent thinks that this approach is impractical due to the subjective passing 
scores. In addition, the model may receive a passing score but it may still have a 
deficiency that needs to be corrected [15]. These are the three main approaches that are 
used. We should also understand how model verification and validation relate to the 
model development process. A simple model development process can be used as an 
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Figure 6. Simplified Version of the Modeling Process 
The problem entity in Figure 6 is the system or the idea to be modeled. The 
conceptual model is the mathematical or logical representation of the problem entity. 
The computerized model is the conceptual model implemented on a computer. 
Conceptual model validity is defined as determining that the theories and 
assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct and the model representation of 
the problem entity is reasonable for the intended purpose of the model. Computerized 
model verification is defined as ensuring that the computer programming and 
implementation of the conceptual model is correct. Operational validity is defined as 
determining that the model's output behavior has sufficient accuracy for the model's 
intended purpose over the domain of the model's intended applicability. Data validity is 
defined as ensuring that the data necessary for model building, model evaluation and 
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testing, and conducting the model experiments to solve the problem are adequate and 
correct [15]. 
2.4.1 Verification 
According to DoD directive 5000.59, verification is the process of determining 
that a model implementation accurately represents the developer's conceptual description 
and specifications [22]. In more general terms, verification is usually an iterative process 
that determines if a model and its resultant simulation accurately represents both what is 
required and what the modeling and simulation developer said would be built in 
accordance with those requirements. Verification ensures that the modeling and 
simulation will have more complete requirements, a better defined conceptual model, a 
more thorough and correct design, and cleaner implementation with fewer operational 
bugs. Since fewer things are left to chance, this means lower development risk, easier 
use and maintenance and a more satisfied user. 
In general, computerized model verification ensures that the computer 
programming and implementation of the conceptual model are correct. The type of 
computer language used affects the probability of having a correct model program. The 
use of a special purpose simulation language generally will result in having fewer errors 
than using a general-purpose simulation language. 
After the computer program has been developed, implemented and programming 
bugs removed, the program must be tested for correctness and accuracy. First, the 
simulation functions should be tested to see if they are correct. Straightforward tests can 
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be used here to determine if they are working properly. Next, each sub-model and the 
overall model should be tested to see if they are correct. 
According to Sargent, there are two basic approaches to testing, static and 
dynamic testing [15]. In static testing, the computer program of the computerized model 
is analyzed to determine if it is correct by using techniques such as correctness proof, 
structured walk-through and examining the structure properties of the program. In 
dynamic testing the computerized model is executed under different conditions and the 
results are used to determine if the computer program and its implementations are correct. 
This includes both the values obtained during the program execution and the final values. 
There are three different strategies used in dynamic testing. The first one is the bottom- 
up testing, which means testing the sub-models first and then the overall model. Second 
one is top-down testing, which means testing the overall model first and then testing the 
sub-models. Third one is mixed testing. Mixed testing uses a combination of bottom-up 
and top-down testing. 
The techniques commonly used in dynamic testing are traces, investigations of 
input- output relations, internal consistency checks, and reprogramming critical 
components to determine if the same results are obtained. We have to be careful while 
checking the correctness of the computer program and its implementation because the 
data, the conceptual model, the computer program or the computer implementation may 
cause errors. 
According to Whitner and Balci, the verification effort should at least include the 
following requirements for it to be complete [21]: 
1. Identification of the verification agent. 
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2. A description of the model or simulation version or release and developing 
organization. 
3. Complete identification and description of the verification methodologies and 
activities, organizations, and individuals involved in the verification process from 
the beginning. 
4. Results of the verification effort, including any identified modeling and 
simulation limitations. 
2.4.2 Validation 
Validation can be divided into different categories. Youngblood and Pace present 
two categories of validation methods [11]. First one is the conceptual model validation. 
The other one is implementation validation method. Conceptual validation is the review 
of assumptions, algorithms, modeling concepts, data availability, and architecture of the 
conceptual model. This determines if the model is expected to provide an acceptable 
representation of the subject for the intended application. Implementation (results) 
validation is the review process that compares model responses to known or expected 
behavior to determine that the responses are sufficiently accurate for the intended uses. 
Ketanni and Oral divide validation into four parts, structural, experimental 
(results), operational, and data validation [12]. Structural validation's core concern is the 
degree of assumption and theoretical relevance underlying the formal model of the real 
world event. Experimental validation is concerned with the quality of solutions, the types 
of solutions, the nature of solution techniques, and the efficiency of solution procedures. 
Operational validation refers to the usability, usefulness, timeliness, and cost of 
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implementation of the model's recommended decision. Data validation involves the 
sufficiency, accuracy, appropriateness, availability, maintainability, reliability, and the 
cost of the data. Experimental validation is outside the scope of this effort because we 
are not evaluating the quality of the solutions. Other validation categories are explained 
in depth in the following section. 
2.4.2.1 Conceptual, Operational, and Data Validation 
Conceptual model validity can be defined as determining that the theories and 
assumptions underlying the conceptual model are correct and the model representation of 
the problem entity and the model's structure, logic, and mathematical relationships are 
reasonable for the intended purpose of the model. The theories and assumptions should 
be tested using mathematical analysis and statistical methods on problem entity data. 
Examples of assumptions are linearity and independence. 
Next, each sub-model and the overall model must be evaluated to determine if 
they are reasonable and correct for the intended purpose of the model. Face validation 
techniques can be used at this point. If errors are found in the conceptual model, it must 
be revised and conceptual model validation should be performed again. 
Operational validity is concerned with determining that the model's output 
behavior has the accuracy required for the model's intended purpose. This is where most 
of the validation testing and evaluation takes place. The computerized model is used in 
operational validity. And thus, any deficiencies found may be due to an inadequate 
conceptual model, an improperly programmed or implemented conceptual model or due 
to invalid data. 
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All of the validation techniques are applicable to operational validity. Which 
techniques and whether to use them objectively or subjectively must be decided by the 
model development team or the VV&A agent. 
Even though data validity is usually not considered to be part of the model 
validation, it is very important. Data limitations are often the reason why attempts to 
validate a model fail due to inaccurate data resulting in incorrect outputs in the model. 
Generally, data are needed for three purposes: for building the conceptual model, for 
validating the model, and for performing experiments with the validated model. In the 
case of model validation, the agent needs conceptual data and data for validating the 
model of the intended purpose. This data can be difficult, time consuming, and costly to 
obtain. 
To build a conceptual model we must have sufficient data on the problem entity 
to develop theories. These theories are used in building the model, to develop the 
mathematical and logical relationships in the model. In addition to this, behavioral data 
is needed on the problem entity to be used in the operational validity step. If these data 
are not available, high model confidence usually cannot be obtained, because sufficient 
operational validity cannot be achieved. 
As mentioned earlier it is difficult, time consuming and costly to obtain accurate 
and appropriate data. Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done to ensure that the 
data are correct. The best that can be done is to develop good procedures for collecting 
and maintaining data. Test the collected data and screen for outliers and determine if 
they are correct. If the amount of data is large, a database should be developed and 
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maintained. If data are not available, high model confidence cannot be obtained. This 
situation directly impacts the credibility and the accreditation of the model. 
2.4.2.2 Validation Techniques 
The validation techniques can be used either subjectively or objectively. 
Generally, combinations of techniques are used for validating the sub-models and the 
overall model. According to Sargent, et al, all or some of the techniques can be used 
during the validation process [15]: 
Animation: The model's operational behavior is displayed graphically as the 
model moves through time. The users can see the dynamic displays of the simulated 
system. These displays can be pictures, drawings, geometric shapes or even cartoons. 
Since the users are familiar with the real system, they can detect programming and 
conceptual errors. 
Comparison to Other Models: Outputs of the simulation model are compared to 
the results of other valid models. The VV&A agent should make sure that; a credible 
authority has validated the other model. A credible model helps to increase the 
credibility and chance of accreditation of the model at hand. After the comparison is 
made, the results from both models should be evaluated by using graphical or statistical 
analysis techniques. 
Degenerate Tests: The degeneracy of the model's behavior is tested by 
appropriate selection of values of the input and internal parameters. For example, does 
the average number in the queue of a single server continue to increase with respect to 
time when the arrival rate is larger than the service rate? 
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Event Validity: The events of occurrences of the simulation model are compared 
to those of the real system to determine if they are similar. For example, in a hospital 
simulation, deaths are inevitable occurrences when human beings are considered. 
Therefore the hospital simulation should generate deaths at the appropriate rate. 
Extreme Condition Tests: The model structure and output should be plausible for 
any extreme or unlikely combination of factor levels in the system. This helps the user to 
identify that the model is operable in every region within its defined domain. An 
example for this case may be, if the process inventories are zero, then the production 
output should also be zero. 
Face Validity: Face validity is asking people who are knowledgeable about the 
system if the model and its behavior are reasonable. These people should be subject 
matter experts. This technique can be used determining if the logic in the conceptual 
model is correct and if a model's input and output relationships are reasonable. 
Fixed Values: Constants are used for various model input and internal variables 
and parameters. This allows the checking of model results against easily calculated 
values or analytical solutions. The results can also be checked with real life data if there 
is enough information about the real system. 
Historical Data Validation: A portion of the historical data (or data collected on a 
system for building or testing the model), is used to build the model and the remaining 
part is used to test if the model behaves as the system does. This testing can be 
conducted by populating the simulation model with either sample from historical 
distributions or traces. 
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Historical Methods: There are three historical methods of validation; rationalism, 
empiricism, and positive economics. Rationalism assumes that everyone knows whether 
the underlying assumptions of the model are true. Logic deductions are used from these 
assumptions to develop the correct or valid model. Empiricism requires every 
assumption and outcome to be empirically validated. Positive economics requires only 
that the model be able to predict the future and is not concerned with a model's 
assumptions or structure. This can also be explained as casual relationship or mechanism 
theory. 
Internal Validity: Several replications of a model are made to determine the 
amount of internal variability in the model. A high amount of variability, which is a sign 
of lack of consistency, may cause the model's results to be suspect and may also question 
the appropriateness of the policy or system being investigated. 
Operational Graphics: Values of various performance measures may be shown 
graphically as the model moves through time. For example, the performance measure 
might be number of customers in a queue or percentage of servers busy and the dynamic 
behavior of them are visually displayed as the simulation model is running. 
Parameter Variability-Sensitivity Analysis: This technique consists of changing 
the values of the input and internal parameters of a model to determine the effect upon 
the model's behavior and its output. The same relationship should occur in the model as 
in the real system. Those parameters that are sensitive, i.e., cause significant changes in 
the model's behavior or output, should be made sufficiently accurate prior to using the 
model. 
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Predictive Validation: The model is used to predict the system behavior and then 
comparisons are made between the system's behavior and the model's forecast to 
determine if they are the same. The system data may come from an operational system or 
from experiments performed on the system. An example for these is the field tests, 
which are common for military systems. 
Traces: The behavior of different types of specific entities in the model is 
followed through the model to determine if the model's logic is correct and if the 
necessary accuracy is obtained. 
Turing Tests: People who are knowledgeable about the operations of a system are 
asked if they can discriminate between system and model outputs. In other words, they 
compare performance of the system against that of an expert in the blind trials. 
2.4.3 Accreditation 
Model accreditation is specified for a particular modeling and simulation use or 
application. The accreditation decision evaluates the appropriateness of a particular 
model for a specific application. The verification and validation data provide the 
decision-maker with a basis for accepting the simulation outputs and integrating the 
results into the decision process. The accreditation decision documents the acceptance of 
the simulation results to support a specific test report. A model may require multiple 
accreditations to support different categories of uses and different configurations. 
The modeling and simulation application is defined by the system to be simulated, 
the key variables to be studied, the test measures of interest, and the data collection 
requirements for the simulation. The definition of the system must identify the key 
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features of the system or environment that the model represents. A decision maker's 
comfort in the simulation results depends on the quality of the simulation outputs, the 
applicability of the simulation test results to the test measures, and the correspondence of 
the model components to the real world problem. This application specific information 
may not be recognizable from the verification and validation reports, but is essential to 
the accreditation decision. 
The model developers have a complete understanding of the assumptions and 
limitations of their models, however, they may not have the same level of understanding 
of the intended application. Accreditation combines the application specific information 
with the model capabilities to evaluate the credibility of the model. Building model 
credibility is a continuous and iterative process. The first step extends from verification 
and validation to documenting the model status and capabilities. The second step is 
application specific and needs to be reviewed with each model use. The heart of the 
accreditation decision is the transfer of the model developer's confidence and 
understanding to the model user. 
2.5 RAPTOR Overview 
RAPTOR is a modeling framework developed by HQ AFOTEC to enhance 
existing analysis capabilities. It allows for quick creation of reliability, maintainability, 
and availability models for almost any system. The user model their systems graphically 
by drawing reliability block diagrams (RBD) and answering questions about the way 
components fail and are repaired. These component failure and repair rates can then be 
simulated to determine RM&A characteristic of the overall system. 
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A reliability block diagram is a graphical and mathematical representation of the 
relationships between a system's components (blocks) and their effect on the resulting 
system readiness level. RAPTOR uses RBDs as a foundation for simulation. Random 
numbers are drawn from the failure and repair distributions of each component, and then 
these failure and repair times are scheduled against a simulation clock. By flowing time 
through the system while failing and repairing each component, RAPTOR determines 
behavior of the overall system, such as its availability. A simple example of RBD is 
shown in Figure 7. 
Engine 2 Hyd.2 
oo 
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Figure 7. Sample RBD 
Figure 7 shows a simple aircraft system. The aircraft has two engines and two 
hydraulic systems that work independently and at the same time. If one of the engines or 
the hydraulic systems does not function, the overall system is degraded but still 
functioning. This assumes node 2 and node 4 are defined as lA nodes, which implies the 
system works as long as 1 out of 2 of the parallel components are working properly. If 
one of the other systems is not functioning then the overall system is not mission capable. 
RAPTOR allows long-term analysis of reliability, maintainability, and availability 
performance as well as mission-based scenarios with specified time duration. It 
graphically depicts the changing conditions of the system, allowing the users to visually 
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examine the operating system during simulation [8]. This feature enhances model 
building, validation, and presentation capabilities. RAPTOR provides one of the most 
realistic representations of real world modeling in the field of reliability simulation. 
2.6 Summary 
The life cycle application of verification, validation, and accreditation is 
extremely important for successful completion of complex and large-scale modeling and 
simulation efforts. Applying the VV&A techniques throughout the life cycle of a model 
is time consuming and costly. Because of this time constraint, verification and validation 
are often sacrificed early in a modeling and simulation effort. This can impact the model 
accreditation. 
The following should be taken into consideration while determining which 
verification and validation techniques should be selected for a particular model: model 
type, simulation type, and modeling and simulation objectives. 
How much to test and when to stop testing depends on the modeling and 
simulation objectives. The testing should continue until sufficient confidence is achieved 
in acceptability of modeling and simulation results. The level of confidence is 
determined by the modeling and simulation objectives. Every new simulation project 
should be evaluated separately as a new and unique challenge. It is not possible to prove 
that a model is absolutely correct but proper VV&A techniques create confidence in a 
model for the results to be accepted and used in decision making. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Adequate Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Plan 
At the beginning of the verification, validation, and accreditation effort, the most 
significant task is the development of a plan that outlines all necessary activities. The 
appropriate level of planning is to identify the required verification and validation 
activities in each development phase. These activities provide the necessary evidence 
needed before continuing to the next phase of model building. The end result is a 
collection of evidence used in the validation and accreditation process. 
Effective planning depends on having a comprehensive understanding of the 
development effort and what is expected from the VV&A effort. Other essential 
planning factors include selecting the most effective and practical tools, techniques, and 
methods to accomplish the necessary VV&A activities. A general VV&A plan should 
include the following types of information: 
1. Purpose and description of the VV&A application. 
2. Scope of the effort and VV&A responsibilities. 
3. Identification of the Project Manager, user agencies, contractors, VV&A agent 
and responsibilities of each. 
4. Intended use of the modeling and simulation. 
5. The developer of the model (when, who etc.) 
6. Accreditation agent and authority. 
7. Descriptions of planned verification activities to be performed. 
8. Descriptions of planned validation activities to be performed. 
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9. Descriptions of planned accreditation activities to be performed. 
10. VV&A report 
11. Descriptions and locations of VV&A archives to support accreditation and 
future reuse. 
The first six steps are the general information about a model. The first step 
describes why and how the verification, validation, and accreditation will be 
accomplished. The second step identifies the scope of the VV&A effort. This is the 
general outline of the VV&A plan and it clarifies the boundaries of the effort. The third 
step identifies who the model project manager is, who is conducting the VV&A, and who 
is going to use the results. Step four identifies when, how, and for what purposes the 
modeling and simulation will be used. Step five identifies by whom and where the 
modeling and simulation was developed. Step six identifies the accreditation agent and 
the authority to accredit the model. 
Up to step seven, all information can be easily gathered. In the next three sections 
steps seven, eight, and nine will be extensively discussed. Step ten and eleven can be 
accomplished after all other steps are accomplished and finalized. 
3.2 Verification 
The accuracy of transforming a problem formulation into a model specification or 
the accuracy of converting a model representation from a flowchart form into an 
executable computer program is evaluated in model verification. Model verification 
deals with building the model right. Model verification starts with verifying the 
requirements, which establish the starting point of the model. They show what the model 
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is capable of or not. They should be clearly stated at the beginning of the development 
process and should be consistent with each other. 
The design verification is the next step in verification. This is the step where the 
model is being put together. After the model is developed, then it must be checked for 
errors in the code. Errors or bugs in the code will result in inaccurate results when the 
model is used. Different techniques can be used at this step as long as they are effective 
and useful for the purpose. 
The steps of verification will be evaluated in the following order for this generic 
plan: 
1. Requirements Verification. 
2. Design Verification. 
3. Implementation (Results) Verification. (Code checking will be explained 
briefly in this section.) 
Animation is a general technique that can be used during the overall verification 
process. This technique will also be explained. 
3.2.1 Requirements Verification 
Requirements verification is one of the major parts of VV&A planning. Some 
requirements come from the user and the community that will be supported by the model. 
Others come from the interactions among the user, model, project manager, and the 
developer. These requirements specify how the developer plans to provide software and 
hardware model capabilities to meet the operational needs of the user. One of the VV&A 
tasks is to compare these requirements and determine the differences and disconnects 
between them. As this effort takes place, the VV&A agent learns more about the model 
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and this helps him to begin making up the VV&A plan. This initial effort focuses on 
identifying the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of the requirement definitions. 
The model requirements are the foundation of the entire model development process. 
They should be established clearly from the beginning and understood by all the 
participants of the development process. 
During the requirements verification phase each requirement should be compared 
to its source for correctness and consistency. To ensure a requirement is being 
appropriately addressed in the simulation, the developers must find a way to detect or 
measure it. There are two types of risks associated with requirements verification phase. 
The first one is development risk, which shows the ability of the developer to implement 
the requirement without compromising the capabilities or the performance. The second 
one is the operational risks that are associated with using the model for its intended 
purpose. 
Requirement verification should be accomplished as early as possible to ensure a 
proper foundation of the development process. As more detailed information becomes 
available or if changes occur that effect the requirements, requirement verification may 
have to be revisited throughout the development process. Any risk or uncertainty 
associated with the development of a new model and risks associated with specific 
VV&A tasks should be documented. Once the objectives and requirements have been 
defined, a risk assessment can be conducted to identify and prioritize the developmental 
and operational risks. The W&A agent then should focus on the difficult issues of 
verifying individual requirements. 
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3.2.2 Design Verification 
During the design phase, the developers take the requirements, algorithms, and 
interactions that are described in the conceptual model, and determine how to design 
them to support the software application. The purpose of design verification is to ensure 
that all these features are correctly and completely included in the design representations 
and documentation. The VV&A agent must ensure that all requirements are correctly 
traced during the design phase. 
Design verification consists of different tasks. The first one is verifying the 
interfaces. All interfaces should be verified to ensure that information could be passed as 
needed for the intended use. Interfaces are the communication devices of the user and the 
model. If correct communication cannot be established, the model will not perform its 
intended purpose. The second task is about the amount of time or memory needed to 
complete a critical software process. The timing and sizing requirements for different 
processes should be checked to ensure that they do not interfere with the execution of the 
simulation. Next the key algorithms should be examined for their accuracy and 
appropriateness for the application. The algorithms are translated in to understandable 
formats so the logic and the accuracy can be analyzed. This analysis may involve 
rederiving the equations or evaluating the suitability of numerical techniques. It checks 
that algorithms are correct, appropriate, stable, and meet all accuracy, timing, and sizing 
requirements. Algorithm analysis examines the correctness of the equations and 
numerical techniques, truncation and rounding effects. Each design verification task 
should be documented by listing its objectives, assumptions, constraints, methods and 
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results. The results must be reported to the model project manager and the user for 
review and future reference. 
All the tasks above rely on the products coming from the design process. These 
products include the design documentation and representations, algorithms, design 
reviews and walkthroughs, diagrams and drawings. The accuracy of all these products is 
important for the efficient completion of the design verification. 
3.2.3 Implementation Verification 
At this phase both the hardware and the software are constructed, tested and the 
actual data are installed and tested. Since the hardware is involved, the scope of the 
VV&A effort can grow significantly because integration of the hardware is included in 
the evaluation. At this point, the code should be run on static and dynamic analyzers to 
identify errors and to ensure accurate execution. Then, the interfaces between the 
components should be checked to ensure accurate relationships. Software connections 
and assignments to hardware components should be checked for appropriateness. 
If there is a special hardware involved in the system (like weapon system models, 
aircraft motion simulators), the amount of verification required will significantly 
increase. Developmental and operational test plans and procedures should be reviewed to 
determine if they provide information needed for the VV&A effort. If possible, share the 
results of the testing activities to minimize costs and increase efficiency. 
During the development phase the code is checked continuously in code 
walkthroughs, however an overall code check must be accomplished at the end of the 
development phase. Code check is explained in depth in the next section. 
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3.2.3.1 Checking the Code 
After the model has been developed, implemented, and most of the bugs removed, 
the program must be tested for correctness and accuracy. First, the simulation functions 
should be tested to see if they are correct. Next, each sub-model and the overall model 
should be tested. 
There are two testing approaches- static and dynamic testing. In static testing, the 
computerized model is analyzed to determine if it is correct by using correctness proofs, 
examining the structure properties of the program, and walkthroughs. A walkthrough is 
an informal meeting at which the program developer (or author) of a design or 
programming product explains the details of the product to the other members of the 
team. It is expected that the reviewing team members will assist the author in identifying 
errors or suspicious areas that would probably be undetected until some later time in the 
project life cycle. According to Deutsch, there are two types of walkthroughs [17]. 
1. Design Walkthroughs: An individual designer presents the design to other team 
members by explaining the structure charts, interfaces, and file definitions. Team 
members look for flaws in the design. 
2. Code Walkthroughs: An individual programmer explains the structure and flow 
of a small section of the code to other team members. Team members again look 
for errors or bugs in the code. 
Walkthroughs are intended to compensate for shortcomings in the formal design 
reviews. The primary objective of a walkthrough is to find errors. The success of 
walkthroughs in achieving the objective will vary depending on the team members and 
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their dedication to the task. Both design and code walkthroughs increase the probability 
of finding errors at an earlier time. There are also other advantages of walkthroughs: 
1. Weak areas like efficiency and readability problems are illuminated. 
2. The threat of a walkthrough improves the product quality of designers and 
programmers. 
3. Junior designers and programmers learn techniques from their senior 
associates. 4. The marginal cost of conducting walkthrough is small in 
comparison to the cost of fixing errors discovered later in the product life cycle. 
Types of walkthroughs can be further distinguished in terms of their formality and 
membership. This type of categorization is applicable to both design and code 
walkthrough [17]. 
1. Internal continuous walkthroughs within the team environment. 
2. Milestone walkthroughs that may include other attendees as well as the team 
members. 
Milestone walkthroughs are generally more effective. These walkthroughs are 
conducted when a particular product milestone has been achieved. Inclusion of 
knowledgeable participants from outside the team will help to broaden the objectivity of 
the review. The participants of a milestone walkthrough would include: 
1. A manager 
2. The author 
3. Other team members 
4. The system engineer 
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The manager coordinates the walkthrough and maintains order. Most of the time 
it is effective to have the system engineer present if he is the one who defined the 
requirements. The author is the most important person as the walkthrough continues. 
They explain the content and flow of the product to the other team members. He can use 
operational scenarios or test cases. The team members and other reviewers; if there are 
any, can make constructive comments on suspected problem areas. Interaction and 
questions are highly encouraged during the walkthrough. A record of all errors detected 
should be documented. This is to ensure the errors are corrected at a later time. 
Walkthroughs are relatively inexpensive devices to identify existing design or 
programming errors before they become permanent in the product. 
The modeler also needs to read the code to ensure that the right data and the logic 
have been entered. A useful idea is to get a second, independent check on the code. On 
the other hand, as an alternate, the code might be expressed in a non-technical format and 
a non-expert could check the data and the logic. This can be especially useful for 
obtaining the system expert's opinion. 
3.2.4 Visual Checks and Animation 
The visual display of the model is a very powerful aid for verification. By 
running the model and then watching how each element behaves, the model logic is 
compared against the real world behavior. According to Robinson, some of the 
techniques that can be used are [26]: 
1. Stepping through the model event by event. 
2. Stopping the model while it is running and then predicting what will happen 
next and after that running the model on and checking what happens. 
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3. Setting up interactive conditions on purpose to force certain events to take 
place. 
4. Closing or isolating some areas of the model so it runs faster, and reducing the 
time to perform verification. 
5. Explaining the model to those people who are knowledgeable or experts about 
the real system in an attempt to get their opinion about how close the model is to 
the real system. 
6. Tracing the progress of an item through the model. 
It is also very useful to watch a model running for a period of time. Just by 
watching the model run, a lot can be learned about the behavior of the model. Another 
useful technique would be to demonstrate the model, either formally or informally, to 
those who have a detailed knowledge of the system. This is helpful in two ways. First, 
this helps the VV&A agent to identify any shortcomings in the model. Second, involving 
the real system experts to this effort should increase the credibility of the work. 
The actual and the expected results from a simulation run are compared using the 
output reports. One valuable report is a trace of a simulation as it moves through time. 
This is a step-by-step history of every event, which took place during the run and is 
written to a file. Inspecting this report can help identify and rectify any problems before 
they become permanent flaws in the model. An inspection begins with the distribution of 
the item to be inspected. Participants should analyze the item on their own. During the 
inspection, each item is jointly analyzed to find as many errors as possible. All errors 
found are recorded, but no attempt is necessary to correct the errors at this time. 
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However, at some point in future, it must be verified that all errors documented have 
been corrected. 
The VV&A agent may also use animation to verify the model if the system being 
modeled is dynamic. Animation can be an effective way to find invalid model 
assumptions and to enhance the credibility of a simulation model. Moving pictures or 
cartoons are used as dynamic displays of the simulated system so that the user can 
visualize the simulation. Since the users are familiar with the real system, they can detect 
programming errors. For example in a traffic simulation, cars might cross through each 
other, or in a bank simulation, customers may disappear during the simulation run. Since 
all these problems are not the intentions of the programmer, they are the concerns of 
verification. There are also risks of using animation. Generally, animations make the 
simulations run slower. Due to this handicap, users tend to concentrate on short 
simulation runs so the problems that occur only in long runs may go unnoticed. It is the 
VV&A analyst's job during verification to continue the runs long enough to create the 
rare events. Rare events occur infrequently and only after a certain time unit in the 
simulation. If the simulation is not run for enough time units, any problems related with 
these rare events may go unnoticed. 
3.3 Validation 
The basic principle of validation is controlled execution of a program with known 
inputs and outputs combined with internal measurement of the behavior of the simulation 
model. The notion of controlled execution forms the basis for a systematic methodology 
for carrying out the program validation process for a simulation model system. A 
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systematic methodology to accomplish the testing gives the user confidence in the quality 
of the end product. Each step in the systematic methodology involves repeated 
applications of the basic testing principles. 
Some test situations will involve a number of separate tests of individual modules 
in the model. One of the objectives of testing is to construct scenarios that exercise a 
program's structure in a particular way. It is also important to develop series of tests that 
affirm the actual content of the simulation model. Using analytical results of the simple 
system or actual results from known or prior systems are examples of such tests. 
Another important aspect of validation is the sensitivity of input parameters. The 
simulation is run under a variety of input settings and checked if the output is reasonable. 
The most definitive test of a simulation model's validity is to establish that it's output 
data closely resemble what is expected from the actual system. The output data are 
compared to those from the existing system itself. If the two sets of data compare 
"closely", then the model of the existing system is considered "valid". The greater the 
commonality between the existing and proposed systems, the greater our confidence in 
the model of the proposed system. 
Once the VV&A agent proves that the simulation model is programmed correctly, 
he can then move to the next level where they have to answer the question: is the 
conceptual simulation model an accurate representation of the system under study or the 
real world? The validation process shows the faithfulness of the model or simulation to 
the thing being represented. It provides crucial evidence to support a model or 
simulation's credibility for a particular application. 
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The validity of a model or simulation also reduces risks. This is especially critical 
in a project that depends on simulation for its development or management decisions. 
The validity of a model or simulation supports, but does not guarantee, project credibility 
in all cases. Most of the time, credibility of a model relies upon the trust that the user has 
in the validation results, the process that produced that results, and the people that 
executed that process. Users must believe in the credibility of a model or simulation 
before they will use it. Validation of a model or simulation starts with complete and 
consistent statement of the requirements derived from the user's objectives. Description 
of the characteristics of the model and description of the expert knowledge against which 
the model will be compared for accuracy and exactness should also be included. 
Validation process will be evaluated in three parts. The first part will be 
validation with available data. Comparison to real life system technique will be 
explained in this section. The second part will be validation with no data. Comparison to 
other models and comparison to analytical results are the two techniques that will be 
explained in this section. In the last part the usability of the model will be evaluated. 
3.3.1 Comparison with Real System 
3.3.1.1 Data Validation 
Historic or expected data collected from the real system can be compared to the 
results of the simulation when it is run under the same conditions. To obtain a valid 
model, the VV&A agent should try to measure the inputs and outputs of the real system. 
In the real world, data are available in different quantities. 
Sometimes it is difficult or even impossible to get relevant data. For example, if 
the simulation studies of a nuclear war are taken in to consideration, it is impossible to 
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get the necessary data. For a simulation study of animal population dynamics, it might be 
a major problem to obtain data on the animal behavior. The analyst or the agent might 
end up spending more effort on data collection than the study itself. In most cases, some 
data is available. In the case of an existing manufacturing system, the agent can obtain 
realistic data about the system. 
The military commonly conducts field tests in order to obtain data on future 
systems. In some applications, there is an overload of data. This generally happens when 
the data are obtained electronically. For example, in the simulation of the performance of 
computer systems, data on the system-state can be collected each nanosecond. In 
addition, the analysts may use the model history to improve validation based on the 
additional data. In the end, real world data may be very little or abundant.   Moreover, 
the data may show observation error, which complicates the comparison of real and 
simulated results. 
Validation data are actual measurements from the real world or are best guess 
information provided by subject matter experts. They are used in validation to determine 
if the results of the simulation are correct for the simulation to be useful for the intended 
purpose. Validation data are the real world facts used for comparison to validate the 
results of a simulation. 
3.3.1.2 Comparison Techniques 
When the VV&A agent succeeds in obtaining data on real system, it is fed into 
the model in historical order. After running the simulation program, the VV&A agent 
obtains a time series of simulation output and compares that time series with the 
historical time series for the output of the existing system. While conducting validation 
46 
the VV&A agent should not sample from a distribution of real world input values. The 
historical input values must be used in historical order. After the agent has validated the 
simulation model, he can compare different scenarios using sampled inputs. The VV&A 
agent can compare a time series of simulation model output with a historical time series 
output by using several different techniques. 
The output data of the real system and the simulated system can be plotted in a 
diagram such that the horizontal axis denotes time and the vertical axis denotes the real 
and simulated values respectively. The user may eyeball the time paths to decide 
whether the simulation model accurately reflects the system of interest, or in other words, 
determines if the model's output behavior has sufficient accuracy for its intended 
purpose. Different types of graphs like histograms, box plots, or scatter plots can be 
used. A variety of graphs using different types of measures such as the mean, variance, 
maximum, distribution, and time series of variable are required. It is important that 
appropriate measures and relationships should be used in validating the model. The 
graphs can also be used in the face validity technique where experts make judgments on 
whether a model possesses sufficient accuracy for its intended purpose. Finally, the 
graphs can be used in Turing tests. 
In Turing tests, the agent presents a mixture of simulated and real time series to 
their clients, and challenges them to identify the data that were generated by the 
computer. The clients may correctly identify some of the data by chance, however, the 
agent can test this coincidence statistically. In addition, the VV&A agent can directly use 
mathematical statistics to obtain quantitative data about the quality of the simulation 
model. The simulation output data form time series whereas elementary statistical 
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procedures use identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) observations. 
Nevertheless i.i.d. observations can be derived from the simulation so that elementary 
statistical theory can be applied. 
Kleijnen applies the statistical theory in the following example [19]. Let wt and vt 
denote the average waiting time on day i in the simulation and the real system 
respectively. Suppose that n days are simulated and observed in reality, i = 1,..., n. 
The averages do not need to be computed from a steady state time series of individual 
waiting times. They may be calculated from the individual waiting times of all customers 
arriving at a specific time interval. Each day includes a start up, and a transient phase. In 
this case, both the simulated averages (w,) and the real averages (v,) are i.i.d. If the 
historical arrival and service times are used to drive the simulation model, then the n 
paired differences (d( = wt - vj, are statistically i.i.d. The t statistics given below can be 
used to check the output accuracy: 
t(n.D = ( d-S)/(sd/4i)        (3.1) 
where  d denotes the average of the n number of d's, 8 is the expected value of d, and Sd 
represents the estimated standard deviation of d. The variable dt = w, - v, is the 
difference between simulated and real average waiting time on day i when using the same 
arrival and service times. Hence  d is the average of the n differences between the n 
average simulated and n average real waiting times per day. 
Suppose that the null hypothesis is Ho: 8 = 0, and gives a value tn.i that is 
significant for | tn.i\ > tn.i;a/2. The simulation model is rejected, since the model gives 
average waiting times per day that deviate significantly from reality. In the case of a 
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non-significant \t„.i\, the conclusion is that the simulated and the real means are 
statistically the same and the simulation is valid. This interpretation is a good one but the 
simulation is only a model, so 8 is never exactly zero. The bigger the sample size is, the 
smaller the critical value t„.i -a/2 is; for example, for a fixed a = 0.05 and n = 5 and n = 
121 respectively, tn.i ;a/2 = 2.776 and  t„.j ;a/2 
= 1 -98 respectively. All other things being 
equal, a simulation model has a higher chance of being rejected as its sample size gets 
bigger. Simulating many days gives a precise estimate  d and hence a significant^.;. In 
a case like this, model misspecification leads to rejection if the sample size n were 
infinite. If the sample is very large, then the t statistic is nearly always significant for 8 * 
0. Nevertheless, the simulated and the real means may be compared to determine if the 
simulation is valid enough. For example, E (Wj) = 1000 and E (Vj) =1001 (8 = 1), then 
the simulation model is good enough for all practical purposes. 
In general, when testing the validity of a model through statistics, the VV&A 
agent can make either a type I or a type II error. That is, they may reject the model while 
the model is valid; type I or a error. On the other hand, they may accept the model while 
the model is not valid; type II or ß error. The probability of a ß error is the complement 
of the power of the test, which is the probability of rejecting the model when the model is 
wrong. The probability of a type I error in simulation is called model builder's risk; the 
type II error probability is the model user's risk. 
The power of the test of Ho: 8 = 0 increases as the model specification (true 8) 
increases. A significance or critical level a means that the type I error probability equals 
a. The probability of a ß error increases as a decreases, given a fixed number simulated 
days. If a is kept constant and n increases, then t„.i;a/2 decreases. Another problem to 
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overcome is the selection of a value for a. Popular values are 0.10 and 0.05 [27]. 
Theoretically, the VV&A agent should determine these values by accounting for the 
financial consequences or overall impact of making type I and type II errors respectively. 
Tests based on classic regression analysis can be used. The first test looks at the 
relative value of the output variable. If we suppose on a certain day (let it be 4) the real 
average waiting time is relatively high, higher than expected (v^ >E(v)), it seems 
reasonable to require that on that day the simulated average is also relatively high (W4 
>E(w)). The test checks that v and w are positively correlated: Ho: p > 0 (p denotes the 
linear correlation coefficient). The VV&A agent can formulate a validation test, which is 
simulated, and real responses do not necessarily have the same mean, but they are 
positively correlated. To investigate this correlation, the agent may plot the n pairs (v,, 
Wj). The graphical approach can be formalized through the use of the ordinary least 
squares algorithm. Testing the hypothesis of positively correlated v and w is simple if v 
and w are bivariate normally distributed. This is a realistic assumption because of the 
central limit theorem. It can be proved that such a bivariate normal distribution implies a 
linear relationship between the conditional mean of one variable and the value of the 
other variable: 
£(w|v = v.) = ßo + ßi*v (3.2) 
The agent can use ordinary least squares to estimate the intercept and the slope of 
the straight line that passes through the cloud of points (vt, w,). The test concerns one- 
sided hypothesis Ho: ßi < 0. The t statistic can be used to test this null-hypothesis. This 
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test means that the agent rejects the null-hypothesis and accepts the simulation model if 
there is strong evidence that the simulated and the real responses are positively 
correlated. This test must be modified if the simulation is meant to predict absolute 
responses not relative responses corresponding to different scenarios. In this case, the 
agent should formulate the test that the means of w (the simulated response) and v (the 
historical response) are identical, and if a historical observation exceeds its mean, then 
the corresponding simulated observation tends to exceed its mean too. These two 
conditions lead to the composite hypothesis Ho: ßo = 0 and ßi = 1, which implies E(w) = 
E(v). To test this composite hypothesis, the agent should compute the Sum of Squared 
Errors (SSE) with and without that hypothesis (which corresponds to the reduced and the 
full regression model respectively), and compare these two values. If the resulting F 
statistics is significantly high, the agent should reject the hypothesis and conclude that the 
simulation model is not valid. 
3.3.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Models and sub-models with unobservable inputs and outputs cannot be subjected 
to tests defined in the comparison techniques. In this case, the agent can apply sensitivity 
analysis in order to determine whether the model's behavior agrees with the judgments of 
the experts. Since the experts can predict what to expect from the system for different 
settings of inputs, sensitivity analysis results can be compared to these expectations. If 
the systems are simple enough, outputs can be predicted using simple analytic methods. 
If the outputs are available for different kinds of settings, sensitivity analysis is a very 
useful tool. 
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Sensitivity analysis or in other words, what-if analysis can be defined as the 
systematic investigation of the reaction of model outputs to intentional changes in model 
inputs or model structure. For example, in the case of a queuing simulation model what 
happens to the output when the arrival rate doubles or decreases to half? Experts can 
predicted before hand what to expect in both cases and then the simulation can be run 
with different inputs. The outputs should be similar to what the experts are predicting. 
Designs of experiments and regression analysis are the most common techniques that are 
used for sensitivity analysis. Most of the time practitioners apply an inferior design of 
experiments. They only change one simulation input at a time. If compared to fractional 
factorial designs (such as 2k"p designs), the one at a time designs give estimated effect of 
input changes that have higher variances. Not only they are less accurate, these designs 
cannot estimate interactions among inputs. 
The results of these experiments with simulation models can be analyzed and used 
for interpolation and extrapolation. The W&A agent can plot the simulation output (let 
it be y) versus the simulation input (let it be Xk), one plot for each input k with k=l,... ,K 
This practice can be formalized through regression analysis. If we let y, denote the 
simulation output in run i of the K simulation inputs, with i = 1,..., n, n denotes the total 
number of simulation runs. Furthermore, let Xjk be the value of simulation input k in run i 
and ßk the main or first order effect of input k, ßkk- the interaction between inputs k and 
k', and ej the approximation (fitting) error in run i. Then the input -output behavior of 
the simulation model may be approximated through the regression model as Kleijnen 
states [19]: 
K K-l     K 
k=\ k=\ k'=k+\  
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The validity of this approximation must also be tested by using cross validation. 
Cross validation uses a subset of simulation inputs and output data to get estimated 
A 
regression parameters (ß ). Then it employs the estimated regression model to compute 
A 
the forecast y for some other input combinations. The comparison of the forecasted 
A 
output y and simulated output y is used to validate the regression model. This approach 
A 
gives estimates, ß of the effects of the various inputs. These estimated effects should 
have the right signs. Wrong signs show computer errors or conceptual errors. If there are 
any sensitivity estimates with wrong signs, the simulation model needs to be corrected. 
Classical experimental designs with n > K may require excess computer time 
especially when the simulation study is still in its early phase. A screening technique 
based on sequential experimentation with the simulation model can be used. The 
aggregated inputs can be split up until finally the important individual inputs are 
identified and their effects are estimated.   In some cases, it is remarkable that this 
statistical technique identifies some inputs, which were originally thought to be 
unimportant. The magnitude of the sensitivity estimates show which inputs are 
important. For important inputs the VV&A agent should try to collect data on the input 
values that may occur in practice. If the data can be collected for these inputs, then the 
comparison techniques discussed in the previous section can be applied. 
Before executing the experimental design (either one at a time or fractional 
factorial), the agent must determine the experimental domain. The experimental domain 
is "the limited set of circumstances under which the real system is to be observed or 
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experimented with" [19]. The design will tell us how to explore the experimental 
domain, because the model may be valid in one experimental domain but invalid in 
another one. For example, older data may not be representative of the current system. 
Different types of laws might have ruled the old system. Similarly, a model is accurate 
only if the values of its input data remain within a certain range. There are some 
objections to this idea because some experts think that a model should maintain valid 
under extreme conditions. This is not a very hard problem to overcome because the 
definition of extreme is relative to each expert. The only problem is to figure out how 
they defined extreme. 
For this research we will comply with the idea that the simulation model is valid 
within a certain area of its inputs only. This area can be defined as the K dimensional 
hypercube formed by the K input ranges and within that area the simulation model's 
input-output behavior might vary [28]. 
As a conclusion the sensitivity analysis should be applied to identify important 
inputs and test for realistic output behavior. This information is useful even if there are 
many data on the input and output of the simulated system. Collecting information on the 
important inputs is worth the effort and might be useful for future research. 
3.3.2 Validation with Limited Experimental Data or No Data 
Sometimes the cost and the time required to conduct experimentation may limit 
the amount of experimental data available for validation. In this situation, using 
experimental or empirical data collected from other activities for similar situations can be 
helpful. Another option is extending the range of experimental data with calculations 
from consistent and validated models or inputs from subject matter experts. 
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The process of constructing referents needs as many credible sources as possible. 
Lack of experimental data requires reliance on other sources. Multiple data sets from 
different sources can be merged into a single referent. The consistency of each set against 
each other must be checked very carefully to improve the credibility of the referent and 
the validation. Sometimes, even a single experimental point can support validation. But, 
this cannot be done without credible data from other sources. Just by itself, a single 
experimental data point cannot validate a model or simulation for any purpose. In 
general the VV&A agent should use extreme caution when extrapolating from a limited 
number of field tests to assess overall model validity. 
3.3.2.1 Comparison with Other Models 
Comparison with other models is particularly useful when no real system data are 
available. However, real data should be used when available. Indeed, using other model 
comparisons in addition to the real world data comparison can increase the confidence on 
the model. 
One approach is to compare the simulation model against a mathematical model. 
It is generally not common for a mathematical model to be able to predict the outcome of 
the simulation exactly. Otherwise the simulation model would not have been built. 
However, a mathematical model may be able to give a crude approximation of the 
outputs of the real system. Examples of mathematical models that might be used are 
paper calculations, spreadsheet analysis and queuing theory. It is sometimes useful to 
simplify the simulation model to the extent that a mathematical model can predict exactly 
the outcome of the model. A specific example of this can be the use of deterministic 
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models. This is a simulation model from which all the random events have been 
removed. In many cases it is possible to determine mathematically the exact outcome of 
such a model. 
Comparisons can also be made against other simulation models of the same or 
similar systems. For instance, a more detailed model of the system may have been 
developed for some other purpose. Or a general simulation model for similar systems is 
already available. If another simulation model is used during comparison it is supposed 
that the other simulation model is valid and credible. 
3.3.2.2 Comparison to Analytical Results 
Analytical comparison techniques examine the structure of models and 
simulations. There should be enough notional data or symbolic values that permit the 
agent to compare the model or simulation with the calculated analytical results. This 
comparison technique must be used starting from the development phase of the model, 
especially during the conceptual model validation. 
Generally, notional values are preferred rather than actual data because they are 
easier to obtain or assign. These symbolic values are fed into the model and outputs are 
produced. They are also transformed analytically and results from these analytical 
transformations are compared to the result obtained from the simulation model. The 
results may not exactly coincide but they should be in agreement at a specified level of 
confidence. 
Analytical comparison has some disadvantages. As the model or the system that 
is simulated grows in size or becomes more complex, the calculations required for 
comparisons also grow in size. Some parts of the system that are simulated may not be 
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represented with symbolic values. In this case these parts may be evaluated 
independently. Even though complexity of the system creates difficulties for the agent, 
using symbolic values tests the basic characteristics of the simulation model. 
3.3.3 Usability of the Model 
Even though usability of the model does not seem to be an important subject on 
the developer side, it is very important for the user. The W&A agent should make sure 
that the model is as user friendly as possible. In most cases, being user friendly increases 
the popularity and the credibility of the modeling and simulation product. 
First of all, the VV&A agent should spend enough time to validate the interface. 
Each and every capability of the interface should be used. Every feature of the model 
should be tested in order to comply with the requirements. For the end product to be free 
of errors, all features must respond in the way that they are programmed. A surprised 
user will not increase the credibility of the model. In addition, these kinds of problems 
will require additional verification and validation efforts before the accreditation phase. 
Additional verification and validation will yield to additional time requirements, and time 
is a very valuable constraint. 
3.4 Accreditation 
According to DoD 5000.59, accreditation is required for all important applications 
where models and simulations are employed [14]. The primary purpose of accreditation 
is to establish modeling and simulation credibility. The accreditation agent accumulates 
data that supports modeling and simulation suitability for a given application. Although 
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the entire VV&A process contributes to model credibility, the accreditation assessment 
and the resulting accreditation decision are the key steps in establishing model suitability 
for a specific application. Accreditation is always associated with a specific purpose or 
application. It is a comparison of a model's capabilities and attributes with the modeling 
requirements generated by the specific problem. To make a judgment about model 
suitability, the agent must have clear description of what the model can or cannot do. 
Two critical steps for accreditation are to clearly define the problem and modeling 
requirements associated with it and to obtain a clear understanding of the model's proven 
capabilities and limitations. Comparison of the modeling and simulation requirements 
with basic model information leads to an accreditation decision. Three outcomes are 
possible; use an existing model as is, modify an existing model, or build a new model. 
This is referred to as choosing a modeling approach. 
Once the modeling approach has been chosen, one builds a body of evidence that 
shows the selected model or simulation is acceptable for use in the intended application. 
This evidence generally consists of basic information about the model or simulation, 
validation and verification results, and information about the data. This information 
generally answers five questions: 
1. What does the model do? 
2. How good is the software? 
3. Are the model outputs realistic? 
4. Can the model be operated properly and the results interpreted correctly? 
5. Is the data satisfactory? 
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The answers to these questions are the basis for judging model acceptability. 
While building the body of evidence, the agent uses all the available information 
generated during model development or by the past model users. If there are any gaps in 
this information, the information package is incomplete for the accreditation purpose. In 
this case, additional verification, validation or other data collection efforts are necessary. 
Prior to accrediting the model or simulation, the agent conducts the necessary verification 
and validation to fill in the gaps. The supplemental verification and validation 
information, along with existing information, is used to conduct the accreditation 
assessment. At this step, the requirements of the problem are compared against the 
capabilities and characteristics of the model and the suitability is determined. This is the 
last step, which results in the accreditation recommendation. 
3.4.1 Assessment 
Once the accreditation requirements (modeling and credibility) are known, and 
the VV&A information have been gathered, the agent can conduct the accreditation 
assessment. The accreditation assessment is essentially a comparison of a model's 
capabilities and attributes with the modeling and simulation requirements. The 
comparison is usually an iterative process. The first iteration usually leads to a list of 
information deficiencies about the model and these information deficiencies can lead to 
supplemental verification and validation work. Once the supplemental verification and 
validation information has been gathered, a final comparison is made to generate the 
basis that supports accreditation. In some cases this assessment can uncover model 
deficiencies with respect to the requirements of the problem. 
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If model deficiencies are identified during this assessment, the VV&A agent or 
team determines whether the deficiency is tolerable. However, in some cases the 
deficiency is intolerable, especially when there is a better modeling technique that avoids 
the deficiency. Manual adjustments of input or output values, or changes to parameters 
within the model may often compensate for model deficiencies. Adjustments can 
preserve the ability to use a particular model with minor deficiencies. Another option is 
to limit the model's use to certain scenarios where the outputs are known to be 
acceptable. The last step in assessment is good reporting. The agent or the team of 
agents assemble the findings and make an overall assessment about model suitability and 
risks of using the model reviewed. Any recommendations or additional verification and 
validation work should also be included. 
3.4.2 Accreditation Report 
One of the responsibilities of the accreditation agent is to prepare a good report of 
the accreditation assessment. The accreditation report serves as a checklist to ensure the 
accreditation assessment or process has generated the necessary information. The 
essential elements to include in the accreditation report are [18]: 
1. List of simulation acceptability criteria. 
2. A description of simulation capabilities and limitations. 
3. Summary report of the accreditation assessment showing how the simulation 
meets the acceptability criteria or if does not meet it, what kind of risks might be 
associated with the limitations of the simulation. 
4. Accreditation statement. 
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All these elements can be contained in a single report or in multiple documents. 
The VV&A agent should ensure the user recognizes the importance of archiving this 
information. The agent should help the user to develop appropriate techniques to capture 
this information and ensure they have adequate resources for preserving it. The 
accreditation assessment report helps the VV&A agent or the team to focus on the 
suitability of the application instead of its capabilities. This helps the team to expedite 
clarifying the major issues and saves time. 
The acceptability criteria (first element of the accreditation report) are 
documented as a separate report or included in the accreditation report. A description of 
requirements derived from the basic problem objectives and parameters are included. 
This action allows others to review and validate these requirements if necessary. The 
description of simulation capabilities, assumptions, and limitations related to the intended 
application is normally included as a part of the accreditation. All simulation 
assumptions and limitations identified during the development and associated verification 
and validation efforts are documented. The conceptual model, which is developed as a 
part of the new model development process, contains most of the simulation capabilities. 
The accreditation assessment report is an essential document needed by the user 
to make the accreditation decision. For the accreditation of a new simulation model, the 
document presents evidence that the simulation model meets the acceptability criteria. If 
there are any criteria that are not met, the accreditation assessment report includes an 
evaluation of the impact of not meeting these criteria. In addition, the report lists the 
potential ways to fix these problems and the associated risks with them. This evaluation 
prioritizes the tasks again and distributes the resources objectively to meet the simulation 
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acceptability criteria. The accreditation assessment report includes comments about the 
evaluation and recommendations about the credibility and the accuracy of the data being 
used. If it is appropriate, this report includes the suitability evaluation of the operators 
necessary to properly run the simulation and interpret its results. 
The typical accreditation statement is a brief (most of the time just one page) 
executive summary that includes a synopsis of the basis for the accreditation 
recommendation. This brief statement includes a list of limitations and recommended 
constraints on the accreditation, and an approval statement for the accreditation authority 
to sign. By itself, the accreditation statement only shows that an accreditation assessment 
has been completed. However, when this statement is contained in a package 
accompanied by other supporting documents, the entire package presents the logical basis 
for accreditation. 
However, for the accreditation of a model, not all the steps in the generic VV&A 
plan have to be accomplished. Some of the steps can be omitted if applicable. In some 
cases additional steps might be added according to the accreditation acceptability criteria. 
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4. Application 
As stated in thesis outline (Section 1.5), this chapter is going to be the application 
of the generic VV&A plan outlined in Chapter 3 to RAPTOR. At first, our intention was 
to apply only the validation portion of this generic plan. Validation only, however, is not 
adequate to understand model performance. Validation shows if a simulation model is an 
accurate representation of the real world or in other words if we have built the right 
model. As a matter of fact, we cannot be completely sure if we have built the right model 
unless we are sure that the model is working correctly. In order to be sure that the model 
is working correctly, a partial verification of the model should be accomplished before 
continuing with the validation effort. The verification of the model is outside the scope 
of this effort but an accreditation report with recommendations will be given in Chapter 
5. 
The verification should start with the verification of the distributions and random 
number generators used in the simulation model. These features have already been 
verified in the verification efforts of Raptor 2.0 (30 January 1996). The new version uses 
the same distributions and the random number generators. The inspection of trace reports 
technique is used to fulfill the partial verification requirement. This report is a trace of all 
simulation activities. The report is a step-by-step history of every event (event log) that 
takes place during the simulation run. This report is then written to a file and will be 
used to make the necessary calculations during verification. 
While accomplishing the verification of RAPTOR 5.0, three different systems 
will be used as a foundation: a simple system, a complex system, and a system using the 
phasing feature of RAPTOR 5.0 (phasing is a new feature added to 5.0). The objective of 
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tracing these three systems is to use as many features as possible. Using one system, 
which captures all features would be difficult to analyze. More importantly, breaking the 
trace verification into three systems allows additional analysis to be accomplished. In a 
single system, it would be very hard to distinguish any possible errors and identify the 
source at the coding error. All three systems use different features and in the case of any 
errors, it is easier to identify and isolate the coding error. Another reason using three 
different systems is the time constraint. A complicated system takes more time to be 
simulated and also to be investigated. Breaking the system in to manageable sizes is 
more efficient. 
Section 3.1 outlined the VV&A plan to be used for RAPTOR. The first six steps 
of this plan are explained in the next paragraph. Step 7(planned verification activities) 
and step 8(planned validation activities) will be accomplished in the following sections 
and the reports (step 10) will be given after these activities are performed. Step 
11 (description and location of VV&A archives to support accreditation and future use) is 
this total effort itself. 
The purpose of this VV&A application is to validate RAPTOR simulation model 
for use by AFOTEC. This application is not a complete verification and validation effort. 
The VV&A agent's responsibility is to develop a generic plan and perform the intended 
V&V activities, and make recommendations for accreditation. This model will be used 
by AFOTEC for operational test and evaluation of Air Force systems. The model is 
developed by AFOTEC (both military and civilian contractors). 
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4.1 Verification 
The test platform that is used during the verification is a pentium III, 450 Mhz 
computer with 128 MB RAM. All simulation runs are accomplished on this platform. 
Verifying the requirements is the first step in verification. Older versions of 
RAPTOR did not have features like phasing, event blocks or cost analysis. Evaluation of 
these new features has priority over other features. In the verification part, all these 
features are tested to see if they are operating correctly. 
The design of the model has already been determined. This VV&A effort is being 
conducted after the simulation has developed. A few recommendations are made. 
Another important issue is checking the code. Code checking requires extended amount 
of time and an expertise in ModSim simulation language used to create RAPTOR. This 
is beyond the scope of this research. 
Therefore only implementation (results) verification from the generic plan is 
accomplished. Three different systems are used in this part of verification. The first 
system used is a simple system. This system uses the basic features of RAPTOR. The 
second system is complex system that uses most features of RAPTOR. The third system 
uses the phasing feature of RAPTOR. Phasing is a new feature added to the new version 
of RAPTOR. 
4.1.1 Simple System 





Figure 8. Simple System Built in RAPTOR. 
This example is a simple system consisting of four nodes and four blocks. With 
this system, the basic features of RAPTOR will be tested for accuracy and correctness. 
The system will be run for 1000 time units and 10 replications. 
The first node is the start node. n2 is the second node in the system and nl is the 
third node. The last node in the system is the end node. 
The distributions and other special features of blocks are given in Table 1 below: 




















































100 - None No 1/1 1/1 





100 - None No 1/1 1/1 
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The event log of this simulation is given in Appendix A. This event log was used 
to track all the failures, capture down-times, and analyze output parameters. Each item on 
the results table is calculated manually and then compared to end of simulation results. 
The individual failure and repair data is tracked through the entire event log. The 
mathematical calculations are done using Microsoft Excel. 
End Of Run Report for Simple System.rbd Simulation 
End of Run #1 
Ending Simulation Time 
Number of system failures 







Total Time Between 
Component Failures 






Minimum        Maximum StDev 
0.759034 97.380220 29.886280 
1.667713 126.136214 40.818164 
0.807927 106.356761 23.274074 
0.135673 93.067539 24.064833 
Availability =  0.412904 
MTBM = 11.159581 
GreenTime = 26.878026 % 
YellowTime = 14.412423 % 
RedTime = 58.709552 % 
The meaning of each item and how they are calculated are explained in detail 
below according to RAPTOR User's Manual [8]. 
67 
Mean Time Between Downing Events: This is the average time between events, 
which bring the entire system down. MTBDE is calculated as the total time the system 
operates (in a green or yellow condition) divided by the number of downing events. The 
total time the system operated without any problems (green time) and degraded (yellow) 
was calculated manually and they are 268.780257 and 144.124230 respectively. And 
there were 14 failures in the system. In our case MTBDE is equal to: 
(268.780257+144.124228) /14 = 29.493177 
Mean Down Time: This is the average amount of time the entire system is down. 
It is calculated as the total amount of system down time divided by the number of 
downing events. The total time the system is down is equal to red time. In our case 
MDT is equal to: 
587.095515/14 = 41.935394 
Availability: This is the ratio of the time the system is up to all time. It reflects 
what percentage of time the system is available for use. It is calculated as MTBDE 
divided by the sum of MTBDE and MDT. RAPTOR calculates availability as the sum of 
green and yellow times divided by the sum of green, yellow, and red times. In our case it 
is equal to: 
(268.780257 + 144.124228) /1000 = 0.412904 
Mean Time Between Maintenance: This is the average amount of time between 
any maintenance actions performed on any components of the system. It is calculated as 
the total time the system operates that is divided by the total number of failures of all 
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components. The total time between maintenance events were tracked manually and 
summed 412.904485. MTBM is calculated by dividing this amount by the total number 
of failures (37). 
In our case it is: 
412.904485 / 37 = 11.159581 
Green Time: Green time is the percent time during a simulation when no 
components in the RBD are failed. In our system this time is 26.878026 %. 
Yellow Time: Yellow time is the percent time during a simulation when some 
components in the RBD are failed, but the overall system is not down. In our case this is 
14.412423 %. 
Red Time: Red time is the percent time during a simulation when some 
components on the critical path in the RBD are failed, causing the overall system to be 
down. In our case this time comes up to 58.709552 %. 
The cost report (given below) gives the operation, repair, and spares costs of each 
block and the overall system relative to the costs defined in the simulation. The initial 
cost, operation cost, repair cost, and spare cost per each unit can be defined and entered 
as an assigned value to the simulation. The overall cost of operating the system is 
calculated automatically at the end of the simulation run. The cost of each and every unit 
in the system can also be calculated. This gives the user the flexibility of changing any 



































Pool InitCost RecurringCost Total 
Series 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Pool Totals 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Grand Total 3255.06 
In the simple system all the costs related with each block and the overall system 
have been calculated according to the event log and matched the cost report. 
4.1.2 Complex System 
The second system used in the verification is a more complex system. Different 
features like spare pool, cold standby pool, resource pool, average logistics delay are used 
in this system. The system in Figure 9 is configured of 13 blocks and 11 nodes including 
the start and end node. The system runs for 1000 time units and 10 replications. The 
distributions and features of each block and are given in Table 2. All the nodes act the 
same as in the simple system. The event log of this simulation is given in Appendix B. 
From this event log every item on the end of run results report can be calculated. 
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Figure 9. Complex System Built in RAPTOR. 
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Infinite - - None No - - 1/1 1/1 
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End Of Run Report for Complex System.rbd Simulation 
End of Run #1 
Ending Simulation Time = 1000.000000 
Number of system failures       = 7 




Total Time Between 
Component Failures 
Component Repair Times 
Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
59.723037 5.225078 221.991348 70.239232 
83.134106 2.039983 499.458498 170.225402 
11.021286 0.039612 48.036386 10.294478 
39.202524 0.112041 217.157591 50.030583 
Availability = 0.418061 
MTBM = 4.750696 
GreenTime = 0.094971% 
YellowTime =41.711155% 
RedTime = 58.193874% 
The definitions of all features have already been made in the simple system. For 
the complex system only calculations will be shown for each feature. 
Mean time Between Downing Events: 
418.061261/7 = 59.723037 
Mean Down Times: 
581.938739/7 = 83.134106 
Availability: 
(0.949713 + 417.111548) /1000 = 0.418061 
Mean Time Between Maintenance: 
418.061259/88 = 4.750696 
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Green Time: 0.949713 
Yellow Time: 417.111548 
Red Time:      581.938739 
The cost report (given below) gives the operation, repair, and spares costs of each 
block and the overall system relative to the costs defined in the simulation. 
Cost Data 
Block InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
block4 1.00 312.77 687.23 10.00 1011.00 
block3 1.00 880.00 621.24 0.00 1502.24 
block2 1.00 351.70 13.80 0.00 366.49 
blockl 1.00 822.16 177.84 17.00 1018.00 
block5 1.00 227.81 53.01 0.00 281.82 
blockö 1.00 945.00 300.82 0.00 1246.82 
block7 1.00 265.11 64.16 0.00 330.27 
block8 1.00 22.42 217.16 0.00 240.57 
blockl0 1.00 315.55 174.81 0.00 491.36 
block9 1.00 259.94 740.06 7.00 1008.00 
blockl 1 1.00 130.64 83.27 0.00 214.92 
blockl2 1.00 418.74 86.35 0.00 506.09 
blockl3 1.00 950.55 49.45 8.00 1009.00 
Block Totals       13.00     5902.38     3269.21 42.00 9226.59 
Pool InitCost RecurringCost Total 
spl 10.00 2.00 12.00 
sp2 5.00 3.00 8.00 
Cspl 5.00 N/A 5.00 
Rpl N/A 687.23 687.23 
Pool Totals 20.00 692.23 712.23 
Grand Total   9938.82 
In the complex system all the costs related with each block and the overall system 
were calculated according to the event log and all the results related with the cost report 
are correct. 
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4.1.3 System with Phasing 
The third system used in the verification is a system with phasing. Phasing is a 
new feature added to version 5.0. Systems go through different stress levels during their 
lives. For example, the stress level for an air-conditioning unit is less in winter. Phasing 
feature helps us to model different failure rates or degradation factors in a system for the 
same simulation run. 
The first step of evaluating the phasing feature is to show that the system changes 
its properties in each phase. To evaluate this feature, the system was run for 5000 time 
units with different phases starting at each 1000 time units. Statistics were collected for 
each phase. These statistics proved that the failure rate changed in proportion to the 
assigned degradation factor for each phase. 
Block 6 
Block 5 
Figure 10. System with Phasing Built in RAPTOR 
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The system in Figure 10 is configured of 7 blocks and 8 nodes including the start and 
end node. The system will be run for 1000 time units and 10 replications. The 
distributions and features of each block are given in Table 3 below. All the nodes act the 
same as in the simple system. The event log of this simulation is given in Appendix C. 
From this event log every item on the end of run results report can be calculated. 
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End Of Run Report for Phasing.rbd Simulation 
End of Run #1 
Ending Simulation Time = 1000.000000 
Number of system failures       = 4 










Minimum      Maximum St.Dev 
40.034307 
Component Repair Times      39.504491 
18.639987 49.982651 12.241958 
2.365845 18.822031 6.146190 
0.407020 201.681831 48.885836 






=  0.955377 
= 39.807390 
= 25.570548 % 
= 69.967188 % 
=  4.462264% 
The definitions of all features have already been made in the simple system. For 
the system with phasing only calculations will be shown for each feature. 
Mean time Between Downing Events: 
955.377362 / 4 = 238.844341 
Mean Down Times: 
44.622638 / 4 = 11.155659 
Availability: 
(255.705482 + 699.67188) /1000 = 0.955377 
Mean Time Between Maintenance: 
955.377362/24 = 39.807390 
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Green Time:   255.705482 
Yellow Time: 699.671880 
Red Time: 44.622638 
The cost report (given below) gives the operation, repair, and spares costs of each 





























































Grand Total     6886.21 
In the system with phasing all the costs related with each block and the overall 
system has been calculated according to the event log and all the results related with the 
cost report are correct. 
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4.2 Validation of the Model 
In the previous chapter it was pointed out that it is generally hard to find reliable 
data about systems. Since data about a real life system was not available, comparison to 
other models and comparison to analytical results are the two techniques used in 
validation process. General usability of the model is also evaluated under validation. 
This is necessary to show that the model is performing its intended purposes. 
4.2.1 Comparison with Other Models 
There are other valid reliability models that are used by different companies and 
agencies. These models are similar to one another but are different based on features, 
flexibility and capabilities. Three reliability models researched are AvSim, Relex, and 
Item. AvSim was selected and is used in our comparison. The same systems are created 
in both software packages and the results are compared for validation of our model. The 
first system that will be used is shown in Figure 11. 
Block 4 
Figure 11. Sample System 1 for Comparison 
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Infinite 1/1 1/1 
Results for Avsim Simulation: 
Total Down Time Over Lifetime (TDT) : 138.2 
Mean Unavailability Over Lifetime (Qm) : 0.1401 
Point Unavailability at Lifetime (Q) : 0.2 
Expected Number of Outages Over Lifetime (W) : 19.1 
Probability of 1 or More Outages Over Lifetime (F): 1 
Mean Time to First Outage (MTTO) : 47.3 8 
Mean Time Between Outages (MTBO) : 49.61 
Mean Time to Restore to Service (MTTR) : 7.16 
Results for RAPTOR Simulation: 
Availability (Ao) 
Mean Time Between Downing Events (MTBDE) 
Mean Down Time (MDT) 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) 















Although the output names may be different, the information indicated is very 
similar for both models. A test of hypothesis can be made to find out if there is any 
difference between the results of the two models for the simulation of the same system. 
Both simulations are run for 10 times so our sample size is 10. The first result that will 
be evaluated is availability. The sample standard deviation for AvSim simulation is 
Si = 0.01047 and the sample standard deviation for RAPTOR S2 = 0.03523. The mean 
availability for AvSim simulation is ui = 0.8599 and the mean availability for RAPTOR 
simulation is u^ - 0.8529. 
The null hypothesis is: Ho: Ui - u^ = 0 
Alternative hypothesis is:        Hi: ui - U2 * 0 
The tests statistics that can be used to test this hypothesis is: 
t0= (( x,- x2) - 0) / SPV((1 / n.) + (1 / n2)) (4.1) 
Where 
(Sp)
2 = ((n, - 1)(S,)2 + (n2 -1)(S2)
2 / (n, + n2-2) (4.2) 
(Sp)
2 = ((10 -1)(0.03523)2 + (10 - 1)(0.01047)2) / (10 + 10-2) 
(Sp)
2 = 0.000675 
Sp = 0.02598 
Then the test statistics is: 
t0 = (0.8599 - 0.8529) / 0.02598(V((1 /10) + (1 /10)) 
t„ = 0.60248 
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The rejection region for the hypothesis is: 
to-5" to/2,nl+n2-2 (4.3) 
For a = 0.05  to.025, is = 2.101, so t0= 0.602 is not greater than 2.101 and it is not in 
the rejection region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to 
conclude that the two results differ from each other. 
The second result that will be evaluated is mean time between downing events or 
mean time between outages. The sample standard deviation for MTBO is Si = 8.1973. 
The sample standard deviation for MTBDE is S2 = 13.3344. The mean MTBO is 
H! = 49.61. The mean MTBDE is [i2 = 47.5621. 
The null hypothesis is: Ho: Hi - u-2 = 0 
Alternative hypothesis is:        Hi: u-i - U2 * 0 
(Sp)
2 = ((n, - 1)(S02 + (n2 -1)(S2)
2 / (n, + n2-2) 
(Sp)
2 = ((10 -1)(8.1973)2 + (10 - 1)(13.3344)2) / (10 +10-2) 
(Sp)
2 = 122.5 
Sp= 11.068 
Then the test statistics is: 
t0 = (49.61-47.5621) / 11.068(V((1 /10) + (1 /10)) 
t0 = 0.414 
The rejection region for the hypothesis is: 
to > to/2,nl+n2-2 
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For a = 0.05  W-, u = 2.101, so t0= 0.414 is not greater than 2.101 and it is not in 
the rejection region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to 
conclude that the two results differ from each other. 
The third result that will be evaluated is mean time to restore to service or mean 
downtime. The sample standard deviation for MTTR is Si = 0.7903. The sample 
standard deviation for MDT is S2 = 0.8949. The mean MTTR is (j,! = 7.16 and the mean 
MDT is U2 = 7.7072. 
The null hypothesis is: Ho: ui - us = 0 
Alternative hypothesis is:        Hi: ui - ua * 0 
(Sp)
2 = ((n, - 1)(S02 + (n2 -1)(S2)
2 / (n, + n2-2) 
(Sp)
2 = ((10 -1)(0.7903)2 + (10 - 1)(0.8949)2) / (10 +10-2) 
(Sp)
2 = 0.7127 
Sp = 0.8442 
Then the test statistics is: 
t0 = (7.7072- 7.16) / 0.8442(V((1 /10) + (1 /10)) 
t0 =1.45 
The rejection region for the hypothesis is: 
t0 > W2, nl + n2 - 2 
For a = 0.05  to.025, is= 2.101, so to= 1.45 is not greater than 2.101 and it is not in 
the rejection region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to 
conclude that the two results differ from each other. 
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Two more systems are simulated to compare the results. The detailed results log 
for these simulations for both RAPTOR and AvSim are attached in Appendix D. A less 
detailed table will be used to compare these two system simulations. All assumptions 
made for the first system applies to the second and the third system. 
The null hypothesis is: H0: u-i - U2 = 0 
Alternative hypothesis is:        Hi: \ii - us * 0 
Table 5. Test Statistics for System 2. 
Mi V* Si s2 Sp to to.025, 18 
Availability 0.8216 0.8489 0.0448 0.0391 0.042 1.4534 2.101 
MTBO 
MTBDE 
100.207 85.3458 30.6357 17.7718 25.0437 1.3269 2.101 
MTTR 
MDT 




12.2 10.4 3.2249 2.2449 2.7784 1.4486 2.101 
Table 6. Test Statistics for System 3. 
Mi H2 Si S2 Sp to to.025, 18 
Availability 0.9612 0.95 0.021 0.0144 0.018 1.3913 2.101 
MTBO 
MTBDE 
150.881 114.337 51.6158 22.1187 39.7078 2.0579 2.101 
MTTR 
MDT 




7.1 8.6 2.4698 1.562 2.0663 1.6232 2.101 
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For both systems test statistics to< to.025,18 =2.101 and it is not in the rejection 
region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to conclude that the 
two results differ from each other. 
As mentioned earlier these software packages have a lot in common, but they are 
not applicable for every system. The types of results obtained from the other two 
software packages do not match with RAPTOR output. The software packages are 
tracking different parameters. They are also very complicated to use which makes them 
hard to learn. This is one of the superiorities of RAPTOR. It is easy to learn and user- 
friendly. 
RAPTOR results also contain the minimum value, maximum value, and the 
standard deviation for each item on the results box. The results for the third system are 
evaluated manually. There are no errors found on these calculations. The standard 
deviations are calculated manually and they are correct. The minimum and the maximum 
values in Appendix D are highlighted for easier evaluation. 
4.2.2 Comparison to Analytical Results 
Sample reliability system in Figure 12 is used to compare RAPTOR results with 
calculated analytical results. These are relatively simpler systems compared to the ones 
used in comparison to other simulation models. The system in Figure 12 will be 
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Figure 12. Sample RBD for Analytical Comparison. 
Each block is assigned a certain reliability value. The event feature of RAPTOR 
is used in these comparisons. The event block is assigned certain probability values, 
while block diagrams are assigned distributions. The result obtained from event 
diagrams is 0.5386. The system's reliability obtained from analytical evaluations is R\ = 
pi = 0.5355. Reliability obtained from block diagrams (using exponential distribution) 
for 10 runs is R2 = p2 = 0.5360. The standard deviation is S = 0.06454. 
The null hypothesis is: Ho: pi = p2 
Alternative hypothesis is:        Hi: pi * p2 
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The test statistics that can be used is: 
t = (P2-pi)/(S/Vn) (4.4) 
The rejection region is: 
It l> to/2 ;(„-i)    where to.o25;9 = 2.262 
t = (0.5360 - 0.5355) / (0.06454 / VlO) 
t = 0.0245 
Since 111 < to.025; 9
= 2.262, and it is not in the rejection region, we can conclude 
that at a = 0.05 level of significance we do not have enough evidence to reject Ho and 
conclude there is no difference between the two results. 
Two more simulation systems are also used in the evaluation. These systems are 
not described in detail. They are also built using the exponential distribution for failure 
and repair rates. The results for these two simulations along with other features are given 
in the following table. Comparisons are made using the same test statistics and rejection 
region. Assumptions used in the first comparison apply to these comparisons, too. 







t to.025 ; 9 
Simulation 
1 
0.5355 0.5360 0.06454 0.0245 2.262 
Simulation 
2 
0.8968 0.9051 0.03529 0.7437 2.262 
Simulation 
3 
0.9992 0.9991 0.00197 0.1605 2.262 
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For both systems test statistics to< to.025,9 =2.262 and it is not in the rejection 
region. At 0.05 level of significance, we do not have the evidence to conclude that the 
two results for both simulations differ from each other. 
4.2.3 Usability of the Model 
In general terms, RAPTOR is fairly easy to learn and very user-friendly. Most of 
the features are working correctly and without any deficiencies. However, the following 
comments are provided addressing RAPTOR'S usability and possible improvements. 
There are a few minor problems that should be fixed to improve this modeling tool. 
1. The first problem is the position of the information box that appears during 
the simulation runs. This box appears at the lower left portion of the 
interface and hinders the lower bar that gives the number of replications 
during the simulation run. This box can be moved to the top and it changes 
to a bar when moved, but it does not stay there in the next run. Each time 
the simulation begins, the box appears at the bottom left. This box should 
be moved to the top where it does not restrict the view and should stay there 
at the end of every simulation run. 
2. During the creation of the simulation system the editing function is 
hindered by the links between the blocks. While selecting a part of the 
simulation, if the selected portion is within two grid squares of a link, the 
model only selects the link instead of the whole selection area. It is not 
possible to select and cut or select and copy a portion of the system if the 
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user is close to the links. This is because even though the links are just 
lines, they occupy much more than their volume. 
3. If the modeler is using a mouse with a scroll button and tries to select an 
area with the scroll button the zoom setting of the whole systems resets to 
3% automatically. This only happens if a blank place on the interface (a 
place not including any blocks, nodes, etc.) is chosen. 
4. If the modeler tries to select an area including RBDs with the scroll button, 
the software gives " The exception: Access Violation occurred in the 
MODSIM Debugger" error. An attempt to continue after this error message 
causes the program to shut down without any warning and without the 
ability to save any necessary information. Right after the error message the 
zoom on the interface also resets to 3%. 
5. While linking blocks and nodes at the bottom of the screen, if the mouse 
cursor is close to the bottom edge, two more links appear with a 30° angle to 
the original one protruding from the same origin. They tend to go down to 
the bottom page without an end. These two extra links disappear when the 
page is scrolled up or down. 
6. All other features including File (New, Open, Save, Save As, Simulate, 
Print, Print Selection, Print Setup, Close, Exit), Edit (Add, Select All, Cut, 
Copy, Paste, Clear, Details, Block Defaults, Mass Edit), Options (View 
Tables, Pools, Phases, Preferences) and the sub-features of these features 
work without any error. The sub-features under File are used during the 
routine execution of simulation runs. The sub-features under Edit are used 
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during the creation of the systems. The sub-features under options were 
used during the creation of different systems. Tables were viewed at the end 
of every simulation run. Pools were created in some of the system. The 
phasing feature was used in the system with phasing. All options under 
preferences are tested and they work correctly. 
7. The Help feature also works correctly but there is no help file in the model. 
There is also no online help file available. This makes it hard and 
unsatisfying in some cases. The phasing feature is a new addition to 
RAPTOR 5.0. Even a modeler who is comfortable with the old versions 
might need some help to fully understand all the special features about 
phasing. It is definitely a must that a help file is included to the program. 
8. While minimizing the whole interface, the interface minimizes shifting 
right. This makes the minimize, restore, and close buttons unreachable 
unless the whole interface is dragged into viewable area of the monitor. 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter is the final accreditation report for RAPTOR. The model results 
must match the known results for the model to be accepted as credible. RAPTOR results 
showed a precise resemblance to known results and therefore no statistical differences 
were found between these results. 
5.1 Verification and Validation Assessment of RAPTOR 
The Rapid Availability Prototyping for Testing Operational Readiness 
(RAPTOR) is an easily usable and important simulation modeling tool for reliability, 
maintainability, and availability analysis of all AFOTEC systems. It has the ability to 
help mitigate common operational test and evaluation problems such as high cost of 
testing, inadequate time and resources. These are very important issues that need precise 
and correct solutions. The only way to obtain these precise and correct results is to have 
an accredited working simulation model. Otherwise operational ability of the Air Force 
would be degraded and this would inversely influence the combat outcomes. 
Verification and validation of the model assures the user or the accreditation 
authority that the right model is built and it is working correctly. It would be very 
assuring if the simulation model exactly replicated world results. Unfortunately this is 
not a possible. Different comparison techniques were used in this thesis to show the 
faithfulness of the simulation to known results. RAPTOR responded very well to all the 
comparisons that were applied and proved to be an efficient, reliable, and accurate 
simulation model. 
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Since RAPTOR is a generic model, it has slower running characteristics. The 
reason for this may be the enormous number of features. RAPTOR gives different type 
of results related to the system including the minimum and maximum values and standard 
deviation, more than that of other simulation models. The built-in animation feature is 
another factor for the model to run slow, however, this feature is optional and can be 
turned off during the runs. 
Another issue for this thesis was developing a generic VV&A plan. The plan 
used in this verification and validation effort can be applied to most simulation models. 
However, the verification and the validation techniques used might differ from the ones 
that are used in here. There are many techniques that exist which might be applicable to 
specific type of simulations. The requirements or the implementation of the model will 
dictate the suitable techniques to be used. 
5.2 Recommendations 
The overall performance of RAPTOR is very pleasing. No logical, numerical, or 
behavioral errors were found. There were also no significant mathematical or statistical 
errors present. However, there are still some more evaluation and improvements to be 
done. 
First of all, the model should be compared to real life system. It would be better 
if this system is an Air Force system, which is already being used, because it would be 
easy to get accurate data. The next thing to be checked is the code. The code of the 
model was not checked in this effort because it required expertise in ModSim II 
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Simulation language. There are also more than three hundred thousand lines of code. 
The amount of time requirements for this job is beyond the limits of this research. 
There are a few minor deficiencies in the general usability of the model. These 
are addressed in Chapter 4 and the recommendations to fix these deficiencies were also 
stated in the same chapter. These minor deficiencies have no effect on the overall system 
performance. The upgrades would make RAPTOR more user-friendly and efficient. 
The phasing feature was tested during the evaluations. However, since it is a new 
add-in to RAPTOR 5.0, more testing focused directly on phasing must be accomplished 
to show that all sub-features under phasing are working correctly. During the comparison 
to a real life system, the agent should make sure that this feature is also used. 
5.3 Final Thought 
RAPTOR is a useful and necessary simulation tool for AFOTEC. It has been 
upgraded over the past few years continually to make it more effective. After the 
evaluations stated in the recommendations section are made, it can be accredited by the 
accreditation authority. RAPTOR will enhance the test and evaluation capabilities of 
AFOTEC. 
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it Log for Simple System Simulation 
Failed,       TimeOperated = 13.100823 System = Yellow 
Repaired,   RepairTime = 0.135673 System = Green 
Failed,       TimeOperated = 48.259814 System = Red 
Failed,       TimeOperated = 54.730495 System = Red 
Repaired,    RepairTime = 12.403896 System = Red 
Failed,       TimeOperated = 14.194100 System = Red 
Repaired,    RepairTime = 33.233712 System = Red 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Failed,        TimeOperated = 76.899083 System = Red 
Failed,        TimeOperated = 48.163272 System = Red 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 3.829377 System = Red 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 29.443027 System = Red 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 93.067539 System = Green 
Failed,        TimeOperated = 26.657414 System = Red 
Failed,        TimeOperated = 41.632619 System = Red 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 7.319627 System = Red 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 48.977198 System = Green 
Failed,         TimeOperated = 76.361136 System = Yellow 
Failed,         TimeOperated = 22.279978 System = Red 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 25.665643 System = Yellow 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 7.081996 System = Green 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Failed,        TimeOperated = 25.840778 System = Yellow 
Failed,        TimeOperated = 138.500071 System = Red 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 12.162131 System = Red 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 14.108229 System = Green 
Failed,         TimeOperated = 100.384165 System = Red 
Failed,         TimeOperated = 55.788401 System = Red 
Failed,         TimeOperated = 27.954402 System = Red 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 8.679739 System = Red 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 13.044265 System = Red 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
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412.500839 d Failed, TimeOperated = 48.862370 System = Red 
420.670363 c Repaired, RepairTime = 85.551761 System = Red 
429.188476 d Repaired, RepairTime = 16.687636 System = Green 
431.837431 d Failed, TimeOperated = 2.648956 System = Red 
435.399391 d Repaired, RepairTime = 3.561960 System = Green 
475.725559 c Failed, TimeOperated = 55.055196 System = Red 
500.000000 a 1 new spare(s) arrived 
516.530907 d Failed, TimeOperated = 81.131516 System = Red 
517.534744 a Failed, TimeOperated = 126.422902 System = Red 
519.084376 c Repaired, RepairTime = 43.358817 System = Red 
533.511974 d Repaired, RepairTime = 16.981067 System = Yellow 
554.653730 c Failed, TimeOperated = 35.569354 System = Red 
556.665747 a Repaired, RepairTime = 9.131002 System = Red 
569.776261 c Repaired, RepairTime = 15.122531 System = Green 
600.000000 a 1 new spare(s) arrived 
661.010491 d Failed, TimeOperated = 127.498517 System = Red 
667.370584 d Repaired, RepairTime = 6.360093 System = Green 
672.788508 b Failed, TimeOperated = 168.883307 System = Yellow 
672.788508 b ***No spare in stock*** 
672.788508 b spare ordered 
686.355527 c Failed, TimeOperated = 116.579266  System = Red 
692.894162 c Repaired, RepairTime = 6.538635 System = Yellow 
693.653197 c Failed, TimeOperated = 0.759034 System = Red 
696.788508 b ordered spare arrives 
697.534107 b Repaired, RepairTime = 0.745599 System = Red 
700.000000 a 1 new spare :(s) arrived 
712.368837 a Failed, TimeOperated = 155.70309 System = Red 
728.875698 d Failed, TimeOperated = 61.505114 System = Red 
738.888291 d Repaired, RepairTime = 10.012593 System = Red 
741.829283 d Failed, TimeOperated = 2.940992 System = Red 
750.462133 c Repaired, RepairTime = 56.808937 System = Red 
770.558213 c Failed, TimeOperated = 20.096080 System = Red 
772.302515 a Repaired, RepairTime = 29.933678 System = Red 
781.988140 c Repaired, RepairTime = 11.429927 System = Red 
792.468290 d Repaired, RepairTime = 50.639007 System = Green 
800.000000 a 1 new spare(s) arrived 
852.819725 a Failed, TimeOperated = 80.517210 System = Yellow 
886.088493 a Repaired, RepairTime = 3.268768 System = Green 
889.848509 c Failed, TimeOperated = 107.860369   System = Red 
894.107067 d Failed, TimeOperated = 101.638777   System = Red 

















Repaired, RepairTime = 32.754266 System = = Red 
Failed, TimeOperated = 14.568477 System = Red 
Failed, TimeOperated = 51.890687 System = = Red 
Repaired, RepairTime = 21.789597 System = = Red 
Repaired, RepairTime = 76.696856 System = = Yellow 
Failed, TimeOperated = 99.377577 System = = Red 
***No spare in stock*** 
spare ordered 
Repaired, RepairTime = 6.489814 System = = Yellow 
Failed, TimeOperated = 18.142941 System = = Red 
Failed, TimeOperated = 18.359843 System = = Red 
ordered spare arrives 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Partial Repair, 
Partial Repair, 
RepairTime = 3.198719 
RepairTime = 11.053136 
1000.000000      Simulation Terminated 
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Appendix B. Event Log for Complex System Simulation 





































































































































Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
Failed,       TimeOperated = 39.211099   System = Red 
Repaired,       RepairTime = 14.046989  System = Yellow 
Switched to a cold-standby 
Repaired, RepairTime: 
Failed, TimeOperated = 
Incremented,  RepairTime = 
Repaired, RepairTime: 
Repaired, RepairTime = 




Failed, TimeOperated = 
Obtained 1 Resource(s) 



























































































































































246.882504 blockl 1 
247.546659 blockl 1 
247.546659 blockl 1 
247.546659 sp2 
248.533383 block3 
Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
Failed,       TimeOperated= = 141.243277 System = = Yellow 
Failed,       TimeOperated = = 95.689837 System = = Yellow 
Switched to a cold-standby System = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 88.335624 System = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 35.797875 System = Red 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 12.306320 System = Red 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 112.588871 System = = Red 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 17.542776 System = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 58.408323 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 5.301907 System = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 192.492321 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 64.005391 System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 92.721732 System = = Yellow 
Switched to a cold-standby System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 44.732347 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 4.240062 System = = Yellow 
Switched to a cold-standby System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 19.812180 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 3.062383 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 64.163821 System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = = 11.192466 System = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 0.319724 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 217.157591 System = = Yellow 
Incremented, RepairTime3 = 75.877931 System = = Yellow 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 91.070369 System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = = 2.100708 System = Yellow 
Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
Incremented, RepairTime = = 26.464429 System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = = 87.836144 System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = = 28.900100 System = = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = = 10.012593 System = = Yellow 
***No spare in stock*** 
spare ordered 
Repaired,       RepairTime = = 9.807952 System = Yellow 
Failed,      TimeOperated = = 0.664155 System = = Yellow 
***No spare in stock*** 
spare ordered 

































































Incremented,  RepairTime = 8.792035 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 70.291559 
Incremented,  RepairTime = 77.352601 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 92.036400 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 112.104541 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow Switched to a cold-standby 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 209.535746    System = Yellow 
***No spare in stock*** 
spare ordered 
Repaired, RepairTime = 29.039651 
Failed, TimeOperated = 82.676129 
Repaired, RepairTime = 7.245153 
Repaired, RepairTime = 84.398345 
Incremented, RepairTime = 26.579860 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 12.959243 
Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 18.869838 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 123.865470 
***No spare in stock*** 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 145.472273 
Repaired,     RepairTime = 7.432442 
Failed,    TimeOperated = 52.162768 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
***No spare in stock*** 
Failed,     TimeOperated = 195.485093     System = Yellow 
***No spare in stock*** 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 63.888729 
Failed,     TimeOperated = 3.908359 
Failed,     TimeOperated = 113.533665 
Switched to a cold-standby 
Incremented, RepairTime = 0.358707 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 75.677606 
Repaired,       RepairTime = 10.494664 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 184.629044 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 8.3 57744 
Switched to a cold-standby 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 31.332956 
Switched to a cold-standby 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Red 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Red 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
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470.495704 blockl Repaired,       RepairTime = 33.355832 System = Yellow 
480.309690 block3 Failed,      TimeOperated = 37.147262 System = = Yellow 
488.250973 Cspl Incremented, RepairTime = 38.855630 System = Yellow 
490.309690 block3 Switched to a cold-standby System = Yellow 
490.351339 Cspl Incremented, RepairTime = 47.188911 System = Yellow 
496.683398 Cspl Incremented, RepairTime = 6.373709 System = Yellow 
500.000000 spl 1 new spare(s) arrived 
500.541502 blockl 3 Failed,      TimeOperated = 314.470463 System = Red 
501.002229 blockl Failed,      TimeOperated = 30.506524 System = Red 
501.794259 blockl Repaired,       RepairTime = 0.792030 System = Red 
505.086228 blockl2 Failed,      TimeOperated = 204.524950 System = Red 
505.086228 blockl2 ***No spare in stock*** 
505.708930 blockl3 Repaired,      RepairTime = 5.167428 System = = Red 
514.058059 blocklO Repaired,      RepairTime = 14.058059 System = = Red 
520.600167 block4 Repaired,      RepairTime = 189.794874 System = = Red 
540.262584 block6 Failed,     TimeOperated = 90.867241 System = = Red 
545.262584 block6 Switched to a cold-standby System = = Red 
558.068913 Cspl Incremented, RepairTime = 12.806329 System = = Red 
567.871284 blockl Failed,  TimeOperated = 66.077025 System = = Red 
589.268101 block9 Repaired,   RepairTime =181.245326 System = = Red 
596.761054 block3 Failed,  TimeOperated = 106.451364 System = = Red 
597.740353 block9 Failed,  TimeOperated = 8.472252 System = = Red 
602.953988 blockl Repaired,   RepairTime = 35.082704 System: = Red 
606.761054 block3 Switched to a cold-standby System - = Red 
617.207908 block4 Failed,  TimeOperated = 96.607741 System = = Red 
617.207908 block4 Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
619.695718 block4 Repaired,   RepairTime = 2.487810 System: = Red 
647.630763 blocklO Failed,  TimeOperated = 133.572704 System = = Red 
647.630763 blocklO ***No spare in stock*** 
656.684868 block4 Failed,   TimeOperated = 36.989150 System = = Red 
656.684868 block4 Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
677.577245 block3 Failed,   TimeOperated = 70.816191 System = = Red 
679.292885 blockl 3 Failed,   TimeOperated = 173.583955 System = = Red 
681.821194 blockl 3 Repaired,    RepairTime = 2.528308 System = Red 
687.577245 block3 Switched to a cold-standby System = = Red 
702.026660 blockl Failed,   TimeOperated = 99.072672 System = = Red 
716.309152 block3 Failed,   TimeOperated = 28.731907 System = = Red 
724.836217 block9 Repaired,    RepairTime = 127.095864 
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System = = Red 
726.309152 block3 Switched to a cold-standby System = Red 
730.210666 block9 Failed,      TimeOperated = = 5.374448 System = Red 
731.863644 blockl Repaired,       RepairTime = = 29.836984 System = Red 
733.088233 block3 Failed,      TimeOperated = = 6.779081 System = Red 
734.579113 block6 Failed,      TimeOperated = = 189.316529 System = Red 
739.579113 block6 Switched to a cold-standby System = Red 
742.581216 Cspl Incremented,  RepairTime = = 16.272063 System = Red 
743.088233 block3 Switched to a cold-standby System = Red 
746.824378 Cspl Incremented,  RepairTime = = 3.736145 System = Red 
752.460606 blockl Failed,      TimeOperated = = 20.596962 System = Red 
754.157292 blockl Repaired,       RepairTime = = 1.696685 System = = Red 
761.750003 block4 Repaired,       RepairTime = = 105.065135 System = = Red 
762.204427 block4 Failed,      TimeOperated = = 0.454425 System = Red 
762.204427 block4 Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
763.520971 block6 Failed,      TimeOperated = = 23.941858 System = = Red 
767.107049 Cspl Incremented,  RepairTime = = 79.529804 System = = Red 
768.520971 block6 Switched to a cold-standby System = = Red 
768.633012 Cspl Incremented,  RepairTime = = 0.112041 System = Red 
771.730830 blockl Failed,      TimeOperated = = 17.573539 System = = Red 
779.622018 blockl Repaired,       RepairTime = = 7.891187 System = = Red 
783.151028 block3 Failed,      TimeOperated = = 40.062795 System = Red 
793.151028 block3 Switched to a cold-standby System = Red 
794.960127 Cspl Incremented, RepairTime = 55.381014 System = = Red 
796.654737 blockl Failed,     TimeOperated = 17.032720 System = = Red 
796.865425 blockl Repaired,      RepairTime = 0.210688 System = = Red 
812.788858 Cspl Incremented, RepairTime = 206.027804 System = = Red 
819.089579 block4 Repaired,      RepairTime = 56.885151 System = = Red 
835.198979 blockl3 Failed,     TimeOperated = 153.377785 System = Red 
836.538965 blockl3 Repaired,      RepairTime = 1.339986 System = = Red 
848.489064 block9 Repaired,      RepairTime = 118.278398 System = = Red 
854.745515 block9 Failed,     TimeOperated = 6.256451 System = Red 
865.632119 block6 Failed,     TimeOperated = 97.111148 System = Red 
867.132838 block4 Failed,     TimeOperated = 48.043259 System = Red 
867.132838 block4 Obtained 1 Resource(s) 
870.632119 block6 Switched to a cold-standby System = = Red 
880.912656 block4 Repaired,      RepairTime = -13.779818 System = = Red 
884.688694 block3 Failed,     TimeOperated = 91.537666 System = = Red 
891.881636 block4 Failed,     TimeOperated = 10.968980 System = = Red 




































Switched to a cold-standby 
Incremented, RepairTime = 0.572427 
Failed,      TimeOperated = 30.237785 
Switched to a cold-standby 
Failed,     TimeOperated = 0.310113 
Failed,     TimeOperated = 73.141352 
Switched to a cold-standby 
Incremented, RepairTime = 
Repaired, RepairTime = 
Incremented, RepairTime = 




















Switched to a cold-standby 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
System = Red 
Repaired,      RepairTime = 85.337971       System = Red 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Partial Repair,   RepairTime = 26.953 542 
Cold spare partial repair cost not calculated 
Partial Repair,   RepairTime = 0.000000 
Partial Repair,   RepairTime = 145.254485 
1000.000000      Simulation Terminated 
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Appendix C. Event Log for Phasing Simulation 










































































































Repaired,   RepairTime 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Changing to Phase 3 
Repaired, RepairTime 
Failed,  TimeOperated 
























































































System = Green 














































1 new spare(s) arrived 
Changing to Phase 5 
Repaired, RepairTime =98.328924 
Failed, TimeOperated =40.565758 
Repaired, RepairTime =28.301779 
Changing to Phase 6 
Failed, TimeOperated =63.749258 
Repaired, RepairTime =10.600155 
Failed, TimeOperated =30.752557 
Repaired, RepairTime =16.687655 
Failed, TimeOperated =1.470496 
***No spare in stock*** 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Changing to Phase 7 
Repaired,   RepairTime =84.398345 
Changing to Phase 8 
Failed, TimeOperated =50.819388 
***No spare in stock*** 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Changing to Phase 9 
Changing to Phase 10 
Repaired,   RepairTime =127.828094 
Failed,  TimeOperated =9.071470 
***No spare in stock*** 
Failed,  TimeOperated =769.145026 
Repaired,   RepairTime =36.653455 
1 new spare(s) arrived 
Partial Repair,   RepairTime=0.000000 
System = Green 
System = Yellow 
System = Green 
System = Yellow 
System = Green 
System = Yellow 
System = Green 
System = Yellow 
System = Green 
System = Yellow 
System = Green 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
System = Yellow 
1000.000000      Simulation Terminated 
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Appendix D. End of Run Report for Comp3 Simulation 
End of Run #1 
Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 6 










Component Repair Times   11.998220 
Minimum Maximum St.Dev 
28.309332 306.189571 98.942155 
1.067708 8.953001 2.695389 
0.344740 54.381696 11.615070 
3.689210 29.079950 6.418175 
Availability = 0.972577457 
MTBM = 15.196523 
GreenTime = 40.587278% 
YellowTime = 56.670468% 
RedTime = 2.742254% 
Cost Data 
Block InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1 1.00 916.55 83.45 8.00 1009.00 
2 1.00 798.30 201.70 10.00 1011.00 
5 1.00 910.12 89.88 12.00 1013.00 
3 1.00 926.09 73.91 15.00 1016.00 
4 1.00 820.55 179.45 12.00 1013.00 
6 1.00 945.32 54.68 3.00 1004.00 
7 1.00 921.58 78.42 4.00 1005.00 
Block Totals   7.00    6238.51     761.49      64.00 7071.00 
Grand Total     7071.00 
End of Run #2 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 9 
Number of component failures = 74 
Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
Time Between 
Downing Events             103.860910     21.068148 314.622511 88.340325 
Down Times                       7.250201 1.485426 12.115139 3.569893 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures           12.911986 0.398413 38.128766 9.613922 
Component Repair Times   12.012773 3.995005 25.908401 6.183710 
Availability   =0.934748188 
MTBM          =12.631732 
GreenTime    = 33.962320% 
YellowTime  =59.512499% 
RedTime       =6.525181% 
Cost Data 
Block       InitCost    OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1                     1.00     906.33 93.67 8.00 1009.00 
2                     1.00     815.11 184.89 9.00 1010.00 
5                     1.00     860.23 139.77 17.00 1018.00 
3                     1.00     902.72 97.28 18.00 1019.00 
4                     1.00     821.41 178.59 13.00 1014.00 
6                     1.00     855.33 144.67 7.00 1008.00 
7                     1.00     949.91 50.09 2.00 1003.00 
Block Totals    7.00   6111.05 888.95 74.00 7081.00 
Grand Total     7081.00 
*********************************************************** 
End of Run #3 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 7 
Number of component failures = 76 




Total Time Between 
Component Failures 
StDev 
138.433886     17.609651     161.085223     50.304496 
4.423257      0.318296        8.282756       2.631559 
12.977218     0.091552      58.077537     11.896779 
Component Repair Times   11.747400     3.163824      29.853451       7.465307 
Availability = 0.969037201 
MTBM = 12.750489 
GreenTime = 36.683760% 
YellowTime = 60.219960% 
RedTime = 3.096280% 
Cost Data 













































Grand Total     7083.00 
**$$$*%**$$$**$******************************##*****#************** 
End of Run #4 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures =10 
Number of component failures = 72 
Mean Minimum      Maximum StDev 
Time Between 
Downing Events               94.315696 0.956191      175.971563 63.936751 
Down Times                       5.684304 0.918555      10.768905 2.829054 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures           13.751471 0.069562     56.287808 12.268698 
Component Repair Times  13.786441 3.719212     28.769461 6.496083 
Availability   = 0.943156964 
MTBM          = 13.099402 
GreenTime    = 32.493553% 
YellowTime  =61.822143% 
RedTime       = 5.684304% 
Cost Data 
Block        InitCost    OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost          Total 
1                     1.00     842.90 157.10 16.00            1017.00 
2                     1.00     883.31 116.69 6.00            1007.00 
5                     1.00     920.59 79.41 10.00            1011.00 
3                     1.00     955.53 44.47 9.00            1010.00 
4                     1.00     776.73 223.27 14.00            1015.00 
6                     1.00     837.99 162.01 8.00            1009.00 
7                     1.00     790.33 209.67 9.00            1010.00 
Block Totals   7.00    6007.38 992.62 72.00           7079.00 
Grand Total     7079.00 
******************************************************************* 
End of Run #5 
108 
Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 8 
Number of component failures = 76 
Mean Minimum       Maximum 
Time Between 
Downing Events 119.803204 1.341078 
Down Times 5.196796 1.422675 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures 12.899445 0.211473 
Component Repair Times 11.760887 3.404244 
StDev 





MTBM = 12.610864 
GreenTime = 35.291434% 
YellowTime = 60.551130% 
RedTime =4.157437% 
Cost Data 













































Grand Total     7083.00 
End of Run #6 
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r 
Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 8 
Number of component failures = 68 
Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
Time Between 
Downing Events               115.857973 5.721780 550.820778 170.616769 
Down Times                       9.142027 0.260558 18.133364 5.990827 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures           14.705756 0.101464 61.234672 13.777678 
Component Repair Times   13.413348 3.623280 29.521524 6.754815 
Availability   = 0.926863784 
MTBM          = 13.630350 
GreenTime    =41.623129% 
YellowTime  = 51.063249% 
RedTime       = 7.313622% 
Cost Data 
Block       InitCost   OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1                     1.00     888.33 111.67 11.00 1012.00 
2                     1.00     802.25 197.75 11.00 1012.00 
5                     1.00     913.54 86.46 12.00 1013.00 
3                     1.00     947.51 52.49 11.00 1012.00 
4                     1.00     809.15 190.85 12.00 1013.00 
6                     1.00     876.66 123.34 6.00 1007.00 
7                     1.00     874.73 125.27 5.00 1006.00 
Block Totals    7.00   6112.18 887.82 68.00 7075.00 
Grand Total     7075.00 
******************************************************************* 
End of Run #7 
- 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 12 









Minimum       Maximum 
12.629687 
Component Repair Times   11.244902 
St.Dev 
1.372250 237.603831 71.580889 
0.677053 17.199420 4.324360 
0.000547 109.502728 5.499127 
2.693152 35.713809 6.843903 
Availability = 0.939844337 
MTBM = 11.896764 
GreenTime = 44.738310% 
YellowTime = 49.246124% 
RedTime = 6.015566% 
Cost Data 
Block InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1 1.00 888.67 111.33 12.00 1013.00 
2 1.00 806.13 193.87 10.00 1011.00 
5 1.00 837.37 162.63 20.00 1021.00 
3 1.00 898.35 101.65 21.00 1022.00 
4 1.00 924.10 75.90 5.00 1006.00 
6 1.00 834.82 165.18 8.00 1009.00 
7 1.00 921.15 78.85 3.00 1004.00 
Block Totals    7.00 6110.59 889.41 79.00 7086.00 
Grand Total     7086.00 
******************************************************************* 
End of Run #8 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 8 
Number of component failures = 73 
Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
Time Between 
Downing Events             119.833343 20.269835 373.362701 109.031475 
Down Times                       5.166657 1.284684 14.271899 3.901198 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures           13.605911 0.377931 51.023985 10.194772 
Component Repair Times   11.604847 3.681945 26.672368 6.292389 
Availability   = 0.958666740 
MTBM          = 13.132421 
GreenTime    =38.589838% 
YellowTime  = 57.276836% 
RedTime       =4.133326% 
Cost Data 
Block        InitCost   OpCost   RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1                     1.00     908.08       91.92 9.00 1010.00 
2                     1.00     824.07     175.93 9.00 1010.00 
5                     1.00     850.42     149.58 19.00 1020.00 
3                     1.00     906.69       93.31 18.00 1019.00 
4                     1.00     874.50      125.50 8.00 1009.00 
6                     1.00     888.59      111.41 6.00 1007.00 
7                     1.00     905.33       94.67 4.00 1005.00 
Block Totals    7.00   6157.68     842.32 73.00 7080.00 
Grand Total     7080.00 
******************************************************************* 
End of Run #9 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 9 
Number of component failures = 69 
Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
Time Between 
Downing Events               106.345797 3.090816 187.997467 70.402540 
Down Times                       4.765315 0.524584 15.584759 4.469667 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures          14.335319 0.131159 45.606254 10.461154 
Component Repair Times   13.644101 4.101679 34.032733 7.110441 
Availability   =0.957112168 
MTBM          =13.871191 
GreenTime    = 31.946697% 
YellowTime  = 63.764520% 
RedTime       = 4.288783% 
Cost Data 
Block        InitCost    OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1                     1.00     863.76 136.24 12.00 1013.00 
2                     1.00     900.59 99.41 5.00 1006.00 
5                     1.00     836.19 163.81 19.00 1020.00 
3                      1.00     955.47 44.53 9.00 1010.00 
4                     1.00     871.49 128.51 8.00 1009.00 
6                     1.00     862.91 137.09 7.00 1008.00 
7                     1.00     768.16 231.84 9.00 1010.00 
Block Totals   7.00    6058.56 941.44 69.00 7076.00 
Grand Total     7076.00 
$;|c;i:$:{i;{<;fc$$;{e:fc$$$$$;i;$$$$;fi;|c$$$$$j|e)|e$^ 
End of Run #10 
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Ending SimTime= 1000.000000 
Number of system failures = 9 
Number of component failures = 77 
Mean Minimum Maximum StDev 
Time Between 
Downing Events 104.503123 0.401614 254.487800 84.983994 
Down Times 6.607988 1.373503 19.198188 5.164669 
Total Time Between 
Component Failures 12.932849      0.089354 
Component Repair Times   12.742949       3.687013 
46.210190     11.484511 
34.604066       6.830859 
Availability = 0.940528110 
MTBM = 12.214651 
GreenTime = 34.773866% 
YellowTime = 59.278945% 
RedTime = 5.947189% 
Cost Data 
Block        InitCost OpCost RepCost IndvSpCost Total 
1 1.00 885.83 114.17 11.00 1012.00 
2 1.00 731.16 268.84 14.00 1015.00 
5 1.00 886.37 113.63 15.00 1016.00 
3 1.00 919.71 80.29 16.00 1017.00 
4 1.00 858.83 141.17 9.00 1010.00 
6 1.00 809.69 190.31 10.00 1011.00 
7 1.00 943.20 56.80 2.00 1003.00 
Block Totals   7.00    6034.78    965.22      77.00 7084.00 
Grand Total     7084.00 
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